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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT POWER TO 
DISCRIMINATE 
Kathryn E. Miller* 
Abstract: For the last half-century, Supreme Court doctrine has required that capital jurors 
consider facts and characteristics particular to individual defendants when determining their 
sentences. While liberal justices have long touted this individualized sentencing requirement 
as a safeguard against unfair death sentences, in practice the results have been disappointing. 
The expansive discretion that the requirement confers on overwhelmingly White juries has 
resulted in outcomes that are just as arbitrary and racially discriminatory as those that existed 
in the years before the temporary abolition of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia.1 After 
decades of attempting to eliminate the requirement, conservative justices have recently 
employed a new tactic: extinction through expansion. By relying on the individualized 
sentencing requirement to discourage jury instructions that enhance consideration of mitigation 
evidence, these justices have stretched the doctrine well beyond its intended meaning. This 
broad interpretation renders individualized sentencing ephemeral to the point of insignificance, 
ensuring that the problems with capital sentencing will continue in the years to come. 
While an examination of individualized sentencing is overdue, the solution is not to jettison 
the requirement, but instead to permit states to channel juror discretion. This Article is the first 
to contend that states may achieve the goals of individualized sentencing, not by expanding 
juror discretion to consider mitigation evidence, but, counterintuitively, by narrowing it. It 
proposes that states employ specific jury instructions that: (1) require jurors to consider certain 
types of evidence as legally mitigating; (2) address the historically racist application of the 
death penalty; and (3) permit unfettered discretion solely in the direction of leniency. 
Channeling and redirecting discretion will minimize racist and arbitrary outcomes and realize 
true individualized sentencing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom holds that the demise of the death penalty is 
inevitable.2 A recent wave of states has formally put an end to their capital 
punishment systems—at least temporarily—through judicial opinion,3 
                                                   
2. See, e.g., David Von Drehle, The Death of the Death Penalty, TIME (June 8, 2015), 
https://time.com/deathpenalty/ [https://perma.cc/JRC4-9YQS] (arguing that capital punishment will 
soon become extinct due to poor implementation, low crime rates, declining justifications, lack of 
financing, and Supreme Court intervention); Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court’s Death Drive, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/supreme-court-
majority-defends-death-penalty/587749/ [https://perma.cc/9HHC-LRA8] (“Capital punishment is a 
relic of a harsher time, now stumbling toward extinction, unpopular with both right and left.”); Dan 
Frosh, Republicans Leading New Charge to End the Death Penalty, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/republicans-leading-new-charge-to-end-the-death-penalty-
11550572205 [https://perma.cc/WM8D-4PMK (highlighting recent efforts of Republican legislators 
to introduce bills to end capital punishment); Brandon L. Garrett, Guest Post: The End of the Death 
Penalty in America as We Know It, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2019/03/18/guest-post-end-death-penalty-america-we-
know-it/?utm_term=.95004b165ea4 [https://perma.cc/2VLM-BXYB] (indicating California 
moratorium “can point the way forward” for the death penalty nationwide); see also Carol S. Steiker 
& Jordan M. Steiker, Will the U.S. Finally End the Death Penalty?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/gavin-newsoms-death-penalty-moratorium-may-
stick/584977/ [https://perma.cc/2MKB-3SEE] (observing that “[t]he death penalty is not so clearly a 
left/right, progressive/conservative debate, which opens a space for further restriction and even 
abolition”). 
3. On October 11, 2018, the Washington State Supreme Court found that the state’s capital 
punishment system violated the Eighth Amendments of the federal and state constitutions because of 
its arbitrary and racially discriminatory administration. State v. Gregory, 192 Wash. 2d 1, 427 P.3d 
621 (2018).  
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legislation,4 or executive fiat.5 And, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
predicted in 2017, even in jurisdictions that have not formally abolished 
the death penalty, “[w]e may see an end to capital punishment by attrition 
as there are fewer and fewer executions.”6 The number of annual death 
sentences—significantly down since their peak in the 1990s—seems to 
support this conclusion,7 as do the polls that indicate declining national 
support for the death penalty.8 
But the most recent trends are not all towards abolition. While Justice 
Ginsburg observed in 2017 that “only three states . . . actually administer 
the death penalty,”9 by the end of that year eight states had carried out 
executions.10 The following year also saw executions by eight states, 
including Nebraska, which performed its first execution in twenty-one 
years,11 after a successful 2016 ballot initiative reinstated the death 
penalty despite the legislature having repealed it the year before.12 
                                                   
4. The New Hampshire state legislature overrode the governor’s veto to pass legislation ending the state’s 
death penalty on May 30, 2019. Mark Berman, New Hampshire Abolishes Death Penalty After Lawmakers 
Override Governor, WASH. POST (May 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/new-
hampshire-will-abandon-death-penalty-after-lawmakers-override-governor/2019/05/30/d0bdec8e-824c-
11e9-bce7-40b4105f7ca0_story.html?utm_term=.8be80788b3c2 [https://perma.cc/T36Y-LRN3]. On 
March 23, 2020, the governor of Colorado signed legislation to repeal the state’s death penalty. Neil Vigdor, 
Colorado Abolishes Death Penalty and Commutes Sentences of Death Row Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/colorado-death-penalty-repeal.html 
[https://perma.cc/SBM6-ACZP]. 
5. After signing legislation that repealed the state’s death penalty, the governor of Colorado 
commuted the sentences of the remaining three people on death row to life without parole. See Vidgor, 
supra note 4.  
6. Washington Council of Lawyers, 2017 Summer Forum with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, YOUTUBE 
(July 24, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGNPBT4wS4c&feature=youtu.be 
[https://perma.cc/UF9T-6MBH]; see also Adam Liptak, On Justice Ginsburg’s Summer Docket: Blunt Talk 
on Big Cases, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/us/politics/ruth-bader-
ginsburg.html [https://perma.cc/YHW8-HG6B]; Keri Blakinger, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Predicts Possible End 
to Capital Punishment, HOUST. CHRON. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-
texas/article/Ruth-Bader-Ginsburg-predicts-possible-end-to-11729635.php [https://perma.cc/AA9U-NE63]. 
7. Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (May 31, 2019), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV6C-38EZ]. 
8. On March 13, 2019, California Governor Gavin Newsom imposed a moratorium on executions for the 
duration of his time in office. Death Penalty, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-
penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/YDY6-LVE3]. 
9. Liptak, supra note 6. 
10. Execution List 2017, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-
2017 [https://perma.cc/99TS-HJDD].  
11. Jon Herskovitz, Nebraska carries out its first execution since 1997, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nebraska-execution/nebraska-carries-out-its-first-execution-
since-1997-idUSKBN1KZ11M [https://perma.cc/HN4B-AB7T].  
12. Josh Sanburn, Nebraska Restores the Death Penalty One Year After Eliminating It, TIME (Nov. 
9, 2016), http://time.com/4563703/nebraska-restores-death-penalty-election/ [https://perma.cc/76FT-
2WAT]. South Dakota also resumed executions after a substantial break, performing an execution in 
2018—its first since 2012. Dave Kolpack & James Nord, South Dakota Executes Inmate Who Killed 
Prison Guard in 2011, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 29, 2018), 
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Executions resumed in six states that had temporarily halted them due to 
lethal injection litigation or the shortage of execution drugs.13 Even the 
2019 moratorium on executions in California announced by the Governor 
cannot obscure the fact that voters in the state voted to reject repealing 
capital punishment twice in the last seven years.14 Similarly, while the 
Washington State Supreme Court found the state death penalty 
unconstitutional as applied, to date, the legislature has been unable to pass 
legislation that would codify the ruling and repeal the death penalty.15 
After hitting its nadir in 2016 at thirty-one, the number of death sentences 
has begun to rise again, with states sentencing thirty-nine people to death 
in 2017 and forty-two in 2018.16 President Donald Trump has called for 
the death penalty for those convicted of trafficking drugs, and, in July of 
2019, the Justice Department announced its intention to resume federal 
                                                   
https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2018-10-29/south-dakota-to-carry-out-first-execution-
since-2012 [https://perma.cc/2EVM-SUMY]. 
13. These states included Alabama, Arkansas, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, and Tennessee—all of 
which resumed executions in the wake of Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ___ , 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), in which 
the Court found that lethal injections using the drug midazolam did not violate the Constitution. Id. Alabama 
resumed executions in 2016, after a five-year period where it had carried out only one execution: that of a 
man who waived all of his appeals. Executions, ALA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, 
http://www.doc.state.al.us/Executions [https://perma.cc/BBY6-AT7U]; see also Mike Cason, Andrew 
Lackey Executed for 2005 Murder of World War II Veteran (updated), AL.COM (July 25, 2013), 
http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/07/hold_dont_publish_andrew_lacke.html [https://perma.cc/26R8-HWDR]. 
Arkansas resumed executions in 2017 after a twelve-year hiatus by seeking the execution of eight men and 
ultimately carrying out the executions of four of them. Mark Berman, Fourth Arkansas Execution in Eight 
Days Prompts Questions About Inmate’s Movements, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/04/27/arkansas-readies-to-carry-out-last-
planned-execution-before-drugs-expire/?utm_term=.b1b1738ab2fe [https://perma.cc/XH8X-22FV]. Also, 
in 2017, Ohio performed its first execution in three years. Mark Berman, Ohio Executes Ronald Phillips, 
Resuming Lethal Injections After Three-year Break, WASH. POST (July 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/07/26/ohio-prepares-to-resume-executions-
seeking-to-end-three-year-lull/?utm_term=.fb2bd5f96633 [https://perma.cc/K4P2-7SLN]. In 2018 
Nebraska carried out its first execution in twenty-one years. Herskovitz, supra note 11. South Dakota carried 
out its first in six years. Kolpack & Nord, supra note 11. Tennessee carried out its first in almost ten years. 
Jonathan Mattise, Tennessee Carries Out Its 1st Execution in Nearly a Decade, AP NEWS (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.apnews.com/f82e6173e6a340bb82231232f1c79dd2 [https://perma.cc/PK6E-729V]. 
14. Californians voted against Proposition 62 in 2016 and Proposition 34 in 2012, both of which 
would have ended the state’s death penalty. Jim Miller, California Votes to Keep Death Penalty, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-
alert/article113661704.html [https://perma.cc/N4AA-ML5H]. 
15. See Editorial, Legislature, Abolish Washington’s Death Penalty, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/editorials/legislature-abolish-washingtons-death-penalty/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZJ53-4W6T]; James Drew, Abolition of Death Penalty Won’t Happen in 2019. House 
Democrats Cite Other Priorities, NEWS TRIB. (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.thenewstribune.com/latest-
news/article229414449.html [https://perma.cc/3G89-PRWP]. 
16. See Facts about the Death Penalty, supra note 7. In 2019, death sentences decreased, but, at 
thirty-four, they remained greater than they were in 2016. The Death Penalty at 2019: Year End 
Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-
research/dpic-reports/dpic-year-end-reports/the-death-penalty-in-2019-year-end-report 
[https://perma.cc/YK9N-RR3H]. 
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executions after a sixteen-year hiatus.17 Popular support for the death 
penalty has also begun to grow again—albeit slowly. While a 2016 Pew 
Research Center survey indicated that, at 49%, public support for the 
death penalty was the lowest in four decades, 2018 saw support increase 
to 54%.18 
In short, there is no end in sight for the American death penalty. 
Certainly, the changing composition of the U.S. Supreme Court, with the 
retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy and the appointments of Justices 
Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, makes judicial abolition an unlikely 
outcome.19 The best course for death penalty opponents appears to be to 
weather the storm nationally, while advocating for abolition in liberal 
states and increasing procedural fairness in conservative ones. 
Against this backdrop, it is important to reevaluate and, if necessary, 
rethink the procedural protections designed to achieve a less arbitrary, and 
less racially discriminatory system of capital punishment: in particular, 
the individualized sentencing requirement of the Eighth Amendment. 
Long touted as the key to achieving a fairer death penalty, the 
individualized sentencing requirement refers to the Supreme Court’s 
mandate that capital jurors consider facts and characteristics particular to 
an individual defendant and his20 crime when determining sentence. But 
                                                   
17. Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Federal Government to Resume 
Capital Punishment After Nearly Two Decade Lapse (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-resume-capital-punishment-after-nearly-two-
decade-lapse [https://perma.cc/SG5B-YCLU]; Eli Roseberg, Trump is ‘Most Excited’ About Death 
Penalty for Drug Dealers. Rights Groups Say It’s a Terrible Idea, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/15/trump-again-praises-strongmen-who-execute-
drug-dealers-rights-groups-say-its-terrible-idea/ [https://perma.cc/B6TC-JLK7]. In late 2019, federal 
courts issued a preliminary injunction, blocking the execution of five men. Katie Benner, Judge 
Blocks Scheduled Executions of Federal Death Row Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/us/politics/justice-department-death-penalty-barr.html 
[https://perma.cc/8BBS-SPPL]. The United States Supreme Court voted to deny the Trump 
administration’s request to stay or vacate the preliminary injunction, holding that the matter would be 
better addressed by federal appeals courts. Barr v. Roane, 589 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 353 (2019). 
However, Justice Alito, in a statement joined by Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, revealed his belief 
that “[t]he Government has shown that it is very likely to prevail when this question is ultimately 
decided.” Id. 
18. J. Baxter Oliphant, Public Support for the Death Penalty Ticks Up, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/11/us-support-for-death-penalty-ticks-up-
2018/ [https://perma.cc/5VRW-6UJN]. 
19. See infra notes 304–308 and accompanying text. 
20. Throughout this article, I use masculine pronouns, rather than gender-neutral language, to refer 
to individuals charged with or convicted of capital crimes because evidence suggests that an 
individual’s gender presentation matters to those charging, sentencing, and enforcing the death 
penalty. See Amanda Oliver, The Death Penalty Has a Gender Bias, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 
2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/are-women-getting-away-wi_b_8227690 
[https://perma.cc/SY43-2WNG]; Christina Sterbenz, Why the Death Penalty in America is Sexist, 
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-death-penalty-has-a-gender-
gap-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/4AKE-48WY]. The overwhelming number of people on death row are 
classified as men: roughly 2,600 are men, and fewer than sixty are women. Women, DEATH PENALTY 
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has individualized sentencing functioned as an adequate procedural 
protection for capital defendants from the racist and arbitrary application 
of the death penalty? Or has the Court’s interpretation of individualized 
sentencing instead rendered it a meaningless formality or worse—a 
constitutional “power to discriminate?”21 This Article proposes that the 
modern interpretation of the individualized sentencing requirement has 
stripped jurors of the guidance necessary to make principled sentencing 
decisions. Only by restoring this guidance will the individualized 
sentencing requirement survive as a meaningful procedural protection 
against the darkest tendencies of capital punishment. 
Many scholars and several of the justices themselves have noted that 
an inherent tension exists between the Eighth Amendment’s 
individualized sentencing requirement and its goal of consistent, 
predictable death sentences.22 Justice Antonin Scalia once wrote that to 
acknowledge as much “is rather like saying that there was perhaps an 
inherent tension between the Allies and the Axis Powers in World War 
II.”23 The Court’s efforts to navigate this tension have resulted in different 
requirements for the jury’s assessment of different types of evidence at 
the penalty phase of a capital trial. 
Like a hand-held fan, the amount of discretion that states give jurors 
expands as the penalty phase unfolds. When first determining a 
defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty, jurors’ discretion is limited 
to the consideration of a specific list of aggravators—criteria that exist to 
narrow the class of death eligible defendants.24 In a typical capital 
sentencing scheme, only if the jury has found the existence of an 
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt does it then consider the existence 
of mitigating circumstances to select the appropriate sentence.25 Unlike 
                                                   
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/women [https://perma.cc/B4HR-SD5R]; NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Death Row U.S.A. Summer 2019, at 1 (2019), 
https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/DRUSASummer2019-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P2F-
N9YG]. Consequently, capital punishment disproportionately impacts male defendants. 
21. The title of this article comes from an observation made by Justice Powell in his majority 
opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987): “Of course, ‘the power to be lenient [also] 
is the power to discriminate.’” Id. (quoting K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1973)); see infra 
notes 114–119 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra section I.C. 
23. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 665 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part), overruled on other 
grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
24. The Supreme Court established this “narrowing requirement” in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 
862, 877 (1983). 
25. See, e.g., Ala. Pattern Jury Instr., Penalty Proceedings—Capital Cases § II(B)(4)(e), 
http://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/docs/Penalty_Phase_Capital_18Plus.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2FL-EBGX] (Where Defendant was 18 Years or Older at Time of Offense (“In the 
event that you do not find that any aggravating circumstance(s) has/have been proven by the State, 
you need not concern yourself with the mitigating circumstances in this case. If you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [the aggravating circumstance]/[one or more of the aggravating circumstances] 
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the specifically enumerated aggravators, mitigators are broadly defined: 
any aspect of a defendant’s character or background or any aspect of the 
crime that inclines the sentencer to impose a sentence of life without 
parole instead of death can serve as a mitigator.26 The Court has resisted 
efforts to limit juror discretion with respect to mitigators, defining the 
ultimate decision of whether to impose a death sentence, not as a legal 
decision, but as a “reasoned moral response.”27 
On its face, such an imbalance may appeal to death penalty opponents: 
there are limitations on who is death eligible, but no limitations on who 
may be spared from death. Indeed, liberal justices have long embraced the 
individualized sentencing requirement as a mechanism to increase the 
death penalty’s reliability and decrease its racist application.28 They have 
also argued that, in structuring a mitigation determination that is 
theoretically over-inclusive, fewer people overall should be sentenced to 
death. Yet after more than forty years of this particular experiment with 
death, the results are not promising. While the number of death sentences 
has declined in recent years, the identity of those who receive death has 
remained the same. Numerous studies show that application of the death 
penalty remains racially skewed, with primarily White jurors exercising 
discretion to spare White defendants and defendants with Black victims 
at a greater rate than Black defendants with White victims.29 
Institutional forces, such as death qualification and the State’s 
discriminatory use of peremptory strikes, that result in disproportionately 
White juries have limited the efficacy of the individualized sentencing 
requirement.30 The Court’s rulings have either enshrined these practices 
or have provided inadequate remedies for the harm that they have caused. 
As capital juries continue to be disproportionately White, the unfettered 
discretion that individualized sentencing requirement bestows on them 
perpetuates outcomes that are both unreliable and racially discriminatory. 
Steps must be taken to reinvigorate the individualized sentencing 
requirement so that it might achieve its original goals; however, there is 
reason to believe the Court is not an ideal forum for change. Indeed, the 
very survival of the individualized sentencing requirement may be in 
jeopardy. In his final decision, Kansas v. Carr,31 Justice Scalia relied on 
                                                   
on which I instructed you does exist in this case, then you must proceed to consider and determine 
the mitigating circumstances.”)) . 
26. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
27. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
28. See infra section I.B. 
29. See infra Part II. 
30. See infra section II.C. 
31.  577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016).  
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liberal justices’ conception of the individualized sentencing requirement 
to overturn the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision requiring an instruction 
that mitigating evidence need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.32 
By framing consideration of mitigating evidence as so personal a value 
judgment that trial courts are neither required, nor advised, to provide 
jurors with guidance on how to determine the existence or worth of 
mitigating factors, Justice Scalia stripped the individualized sentencing 
requirement of all context. If Justice Scalia’s reasoning has staying power, 
it will render the individualized sentencing requirement hollow to the 
point of insignificance, ensuring that racially discriminatory and arbitrary 
death sentences will continue in the years to come. 
This Article re-examines the individualized sentencing requirement 
and argues that changes in its implementation are necessary both to 
achieve its original aims and to ensure its survival. Given the trajectory of 
today’s Supreme Court, the best answers lie in state legislatures and rule-
making bodies. First, I propose the counterintuitive solution that states 
should require mitigation instructions that channel juror discretion during 
the penalty phase. Successful instructions would inform jurors that certain 
types of evidence are legally mitigating. These instructions would also 
explain that the law requires the jury to consider this evidence as 
supporting a life sentence. While such instructions cabin juror discretion, 
I argue that they do not run afoul of the Court’s individualized sentencing 
requirement and, to the contrary, reinvigorate that requirement. To curb 
race-based decision-making, I propose a “race salient debunking 
instruction” that informs jurors of the historically racist application of the 
death penalty and explicitly forbids them from considering race in their 
sentencing decision. Finally, I propose that states continue to employ 
unfettered discretion in one direction only: towards mercy. I propose a 
mercy instruction that informs the jury of its power to spare a defendant’s 
life irrespective of the evidence presented at the penalty phase. While such 
an instruction may result in some arbitrary outcomes, by channeling juror 
discretion towards leniency, it will also achieve one of the goals of the 
individualized sentencing requirement: it will shrink the class of those 
sentenced to death—and by extension those wrongly sentenced to death. 
This Article makes the case for this solution in four parts. Part I 
recounts the relevant history of the Supreme Court’s individualized 
sentencing jurisprudence. I argue that, although the requirement was the 
brainchild of moderate justices, liberal justices soon embraced it as a 
mechanism to improve reliability and reduce racism. As the Court began 
to equate individualized sentencing with expansive juror discretion, 
                                                   
32. Id. at 642. 
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conservative voices began to decry this change as inconsistent with 
Furman’s mandate of consistent application,33 leading to distinct 
ideological camps on the Court. Part II explores the modern system of 
capital punishment and reveals that, despite the exercise of individualized 
sentencing, racist application of the death penalty continues to be the 
norm. This Part proposes that the liberal goals of the individualized 
sentencing requirement are unlikely to be realized while the practices of 
death qualification and the race-based exercise of peremptory strikes 
continue to result in disproportionately White juries. Part III argues that 
the Supreme Court is unlikely to mend individualized sentencing in the 
near future. This Part explores the majority decision in the most recent 
individualized sentencing case, Kansas v. Carr, and argues that Carr 
proposes the broadest interpretation to date of the Eighth Amendment’s 
individualized sentencing requirement. Authored by Justice Scalia in an 
intellectual about-face, Carr imposes a level of abstractness on the jury’s 
assessment of mitigating circumstances that may one day render the 
individualized sentencing requirement meaningless. Part IV argues that 
because judicial solutions are unlikely, legislative ones are required to 
reinvigorate the individualized sentencing requirement. This Part 
proposes that states enact specific jury instructions that channel discretion 
during the mitigation portion of the penalty phase, counteract race-based 
decision-making, and permit jurors to exercise discretion only in favor of 
leniency. 
I. TWO OPPOSING PRINCIPLES 
In this Part, I recount the origin of the Eighth Amendment’s twin 
requirements of consistency and individualization, in the years following 
the Supreme Court’s abolition and reinstatement of the death penalty in 
the 1970s. I then argue that liberal justices championed the expansion of 
the individualized sentencing requirement as a way of enhancing the 
reliability of capital punishment and reducing its racist application. 
Finally, I explore how the tension between consistency and individualized 
sentencing resulted in competing ideological camps on the Court. 
A. The Origin of the Requirements of Non-arbitrariness and 
Individualized Sentencing 
In the late 1960s, popular support for the death penalty was at an all-
time low, with less than 50% of the country approving of the 
                                                   
33. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
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punishment.34 Only just over 600 people were on death row nationwide, 
and executions were declining.35 In 1963, there were only twenty-one 
executions; in 1964 there were fifteen; and in 1965 there were only 
seven.36 In 1966, a single execution was carried out, and in 1967, there 
were only two executions.37 
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court found the death penalty to 
be unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia,38 a fractured, 5-4 decision.39 
The decision itself was a one-paragraph per curiam decision.40 Each of the 
nine justices wrote a separate opinion, with five of them writing 
concurrences giving their individual reasons for finding that the death 
penalty violated the cruel and unusual punishment prong of the Eighth 
Amendment. Two of the justices, Justices Brennan and Marshall, would 
have found that the death penalty was unconstitutional in all 
circumstances.41 While Justice Brennan emphasized the death penalty’s 
arbitrary application,42 Justice Marshall argued that the “untrammeled 
discretion” of juries amounted to an “open invitation” to engage in racial 
discrimination.43 A third justice, Justice Douglas both decried the 
arbitrariness of capital punishment and explained how unfettered 
discretion led to racist results.44 
The remaining two concurring justices, Justices Stewart and White, 
found no need to decide definitively whether capital punishment violated 
the Eighth Amendment. Instead, these justices found merely that the 
capital punishments systems of the states of Texas and Georgia, as they 
were applied in the cases before the Court, violated the Eighth 
Amendment.45 Both opinions emphasized arbitrariness instead of racism, 
                                                   
34. According to a 1966 Gallup poll only 42% of Americans supported the death penalty. The 
Abolitionist Movement, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-
research/history-of-the-death-penalty/the-abolitionist-movement [https://perma.cc/NF3C-VCZQ].  
35. Furman, 408 U.S. at 291–92 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
36. Id. at 293.  
37. Id. 
38. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).   
39. Id. at 239–40.  
40. Id.  
41. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 365–69 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
42. Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When the rate of infliction is at this low level, it is highly 
implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected 
for this punishment. No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in those terms 
the few who die from the many who go to prison.”). Although Brennan doubted any laws could be 
drawn to parse so fine a distinction, he noted that contemporary state capital sentencing statutes 
exacerbated the problem: “our procedures in death cases, rather than resulting in the selection of 
‘extreme’ cases for this punishment, actually sanction an arbitrary selection.” Id. at 294–95. 
43. Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
44. Id. at 248–250 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
45. Id. at 306, 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310–11, 314 (White, J., concurring).  
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but under different theories. Justice White argued that the death penalty 
was too infrequently applied to be anything other than an arbitrary 
punishment.46 White argued that the state legislatures had ceded too much 
discretion to judges and juries, suggesting that a constitutional system of 
capital punishment would be one in which the penalty were mandated for 
certain crimes.47 Stewart put to the side the question of whether such a 
mandatory scheme would be constitutional and instead found that the 
Texas and Georgia statutes violated the Eighth Amendment because they 
were “so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”48 Stewart’s opinion is best 
summed up in its oft-quoted line: “[t]hese death sentences are cruel and 
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel 
and  unusual.”49 
As the narrowest opinions, Justice Stewart and Justice White’s 
reasoning became law.50 As a result, the takeaway from Furman was that 
the death penalty was unconstitutional, not because it was racist or an 
affront to human dignity, but because it was arbitrarily applied.51 The 
Court later described Furman as mandating that “discretion must be 
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary 
and capricious action.”52 
The Furman decision proved wildly unpopular—something with 
which the fractured opinions did not help.53 During the four years in which 
the death penalty ceased to function in the United States, thirty-five states 
and the federal government wrote and enacted new capital punishment 
statutes, designed to address the arbitrariness complaint.54 These statutes 
typically took one of two forms. First, states like Georgia and Florida 
                                                   
46. Id. at 313 (“[T]here is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death 
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”). 
47. Id. at 314.  
48. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
49. Id. at 309.  
50. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (“Since five Justices wrote separately in 
support of the judgments in Furman, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds—Mr. Justice Stewart 
and Mr. Justice White.”). 
51. Justice Stewart considered and dismissed as unproved the argument that the true problem was 
not that the death penalty was imposed in an arbitrary manner, but that it was imposed in a racist 
manner. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“My concurring Brothers have 
demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, 
it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race. But racial discrimination has not been proved, 
and I put it to one side.” (citation omitted)).  
52. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189. 
53. CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 219 (2016) [hereinafter STEIKER & STEIKER, COURTING DEATH] (discussing 
Gallup poll results that indicated an increase in public support of the death penalty following Furman). 
54. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179 n.23, 179–80 n.24. 
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responded most directly to Justice Stewart’s lightning strike concerns. 
They bifurcated capital trials into two phases: a culpability phase and a 
penalty phase.55 They attempted to narrow discretion by establishing 
criteria that determined both if an individual were eligible for the death 
penalty and if the punishment were a good fit under the circumstances.56 
In a second approach, states like North Carolina and Louisiana strove to 
attain perfect consistency.57 They interpreted Justice White’s infrequency 
concerns as a call to eliminate discretion entirely and established a capital 
punishment scheme where the death penalty was mandatory for 
certain  crimes.58 
Four years later, the Court declared the death penalty constitutional in 
certain circumstances in five decisions all released on July 2, 1976.59 In 
Gregg v. Georgia60 and Proffitt v. Florida,61 the Court approved of similar 
capital sentencing statutes in Georgia and Florida, both of which 
contained mechanisms designed to channel sentencer discretion and 
promote consistency.62 Most notably, these states limited the number of 
death eligible crimes and required jurors to weigh aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances to determine punishment.63 The Court held that 
                                                   
55. Id. at 162–63. 
56. Id. at 162–64, 180–81; see generally Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (discussing Florida 
capital sentencing scheme that employed a balancing test of statutory mitigating and aggravating 
factors to determine if a death sentence should be imposed); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) 
(involving Texas capital sentencing scheme that permitted a jury to impose a death sentence only after 
answering three statutorily-mandated questions in the affirmative). 
57. See generally Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (discussing these states’ post-
Furman decision to mandate the death penalty as punishment for first-degree murder, rather than 
allowing for jury discretion). 
58. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 180; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280.  
59. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153–54; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280; Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 325 (1976); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262. 
60. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
61. 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
62. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153–54; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248. 
63. The Georgia and Florida statutes had three key components, each designed to limit 
arbitrariness: bifurcated capital trials, required weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, and 
mandatory appellate review. First, both statutes required bifurcated capital trials and instructed jurors 
to consider enumerated factors, which aggravated or mitigated the crime or the defendant’s 
culpability, to determine an appropriate punishment. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248. 
Second, the Court explained that Georgia and Florida had sufficiently narrowed the class of those 
eligible for the death penalty. Georgia accomplished this by requiring the jury to find the existence of 
at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty 
could be imposed. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196–97. Florida’s statute was similar, requiring the jury to find 
that an aggravating circumstance existed and that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250 (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1976)). Georgia 
juries did not have to find the existence of any mitigating factors in order to choose mercy. Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 197. As a result, the Court held, the jury’s discretion was no longer unguided and 
directionless in these states, as the jury’s attention was drawn to specific characteristics of the crime. 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248–50. Third, as a final bastion against arbitrariness, 
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these limits on discretion adequately addressed the “basic concern of 
Furman centered on those defendants who were being condemned to 
death capriciously and arbitrarily.”64 
While championing fettered discretion as the path to non-arbitrariness 
in Gregg and Proffitt, the Supreme Court bristled at a uniform imposition 
of the death penalty that would have eliminated discretion entirely. The 
North Carolina and Louisiana mandatory sentencing schemes, which 
required a death sentence for certain crimes, did not fare well, despite their 
aims of perfect consistency.65 In finding the former state’s statute 
unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina,66 the Court emphasized 
the historical discomfort Americans had exhibited toward mandatory 
capital punishment, noting that states initially responded to this 
discomfort by limiting the classes of crimes for which the death penalty 
could be imposed.67 When this remedy proved insufficient, jurors took 
matters into their own hands by employing jury nullification, or refusing 
to convict legally guilty defendant of crimes that required death.68 Second, 
the Court posited that a mandatory system would lead to an imposition of 
the death penalty that was too frequent to be consistent with contemporary 
values, noting that “even in first-degree murder cases juries with 
sentencing discretion do not impose the death penalty ‘with any 
great  frequency.’”69 
In striking down perfect consistency, the Court recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment required individualized sentencing: “one of the most 
significant developments in our society’s treatment of capital punishment 
has been the rejection of the common-law practice of inexorably imposing 
a death sentence upon every person convicted of a specified offense.”70 In 
other words, the Court recognized that sentencing a capital defendant on 
an individual, case-by-case, basis was “a constitutionally indispensable” 
part of any state’s capital sentencing scheme.71 The Woodson plurality 
                                                   
both Georgia and Florida provided for mandatory appellate review by the state supreme court. Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 198; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250. 
64. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206.  
65. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286, 287 n.6 (1976) (“The North Carolina General 
Assembly in 1974 followed the court’s lead and enacted a new statute that was essentially unchanged 
from the old one except that it made the death penalty mandatory.”). 
66. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
67. Id. at 289–90. 
68. Id. at 290–91. 
69. Id. at 295 (quoting HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 436 (1966)).  
70. Id. at 301.  
71. Id. at 304. The plurality opinion in Roberts v. Louisiana similarly found that the Louisiana 
scheme violated the Eighth Amendment because it provided “no meaningful opportunity for 
consideration of mitigating factors presented by the circumstances of the particular crime or by the 
attributes of the individual offender.” 428 U.S. 325, 333–34 (1976). 
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explained that the Eighth Amendment rested on a “fundamental respect 
for humanity” that required that consideration of “relevant facets of the 
character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the 
particular offense,” as well as “the possibility of compassionate or 
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.”72 
Mandatory sentencing offended the constitution because it treated those 
convicted of capital crimes “not as uniquely individual human beings, but 
as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the 
blind infliction of the penalty of death.”73 Thus, the Court held that 
consistency alone was not sufficient: only state capital sentencing statutes 
with mechanisms designed to ensure the twin values of consistency and 
individualized sentencing comported with the Eighth Amendment.74 
The Court made these two requirements explicit in a fifth case, Jurek 
v. Texas,75 in which it upheld the constitutionality of the Texas capital 
sentencing statute. Unlike in Georgia or Florida, the Texas statute 
contained no reference to aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 
Instead, it fettered discretion, both by limiting the crimes eligible for 
capital punishment to five specific types of murder76 and by requiring the 
jury to answer specific questions in its sentencing determination, 
regarding the deliberate nature of the crime; the likelihood the defendant 
would be dangerous in the future; and the existence of provocation by 
the  victim.77  
The Court found that, although it differed from the Georgia and Florida 
schemes, the Texas statute was constitutional because it included aspects 
both of fettered discretion and of individualized sentencing. The Court 
found that narrowing the number and types of crimes that rendered one 
                                                   
72. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
73. Id. 
74. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 153–54 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248 (1976); 
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301–04. 
75. 428 U.S. at 262 (1976).  
76. These were “murder of a peace officer or fireman; murder committed in the course of 
kidnaping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson; murder committed for remuneration; murder 
committed while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution; and murder committed by 
a prison inmate when the victim is a prison employee.” Id. at 268 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE 
§ 19.03  (1974)). 
77. Specifically, these questions were “‘(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the 
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death 
of the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would 
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised 
by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in 
response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.’” Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269 (quoting TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (West 1975)). An answer of “no” to any of the questions resulted in 
a life sentence, while answers of “yes” to all applicable questions resulted in a sentence of death.  
77. Id. The statute further provided for bifurcated trials: following a guilty verdict, a separate 
sentencing proceeding would be conducted. Id. 
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eligible for capital punishment served the same purpose as a required 
finding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.78 In a holding it 
would later refine in subsequent cases,79 the Court also found that the 
Texas statute, through its special issues, provided for “the individualized 
sentencing determination that we today have held in Woodson v. North 
Carolina . . . to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”80 
The Court’s conclusion turned on Texas’s promise to interpret the second 
question to permit defendants to introduce and argue mitigating 
circumstances.81 So holding, the Court made clear that, just like 
consistency, individualized sentencing was a constitutional mandate.82 
B. The Liberal Embrace of the Individualized Sentencing Requirement 
More moderate members of the Court—those who believed capital 
punishment should be improved, not abolished, such as Justice Stewart, 
Justice Powell, and even Chief Justice Burger—originally championed 
the expansion of the individualized sentencing requirement as a corrective 
measure for the problems noted in Furman. Over time, as the likelihood 
of abolition grew more and more remote, liberal justices like Justice 
Brennan and Justice Stevens took up the cause, turning to the requirement 
as a way to increase the death penalty’s reliability and decrease its 
racist  application. 
1. The Expansion of the Doctrine 
Over the next decade, the Court expanded the meaning of the 
individualized sentencing requirement to preclude states from limiting 
jurors’ consideration of a broad range of evidence. The result was an 
unfettering of sentencer discretion. 
In two key cases, Lockett v. Ohio83 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,84 the 
Court reversed death sentences, where states had too narrowly limited the 
sentencer’s power to consider factors that justified a life sentence. In 
                                                   
78. Id. at 270. (“[E]ach of the five classes of murders made capital by the Texas statute is 
encompassed in Georgia and Florida by one or more of their statutory aggravating circumstances.”). 
79. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 262 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 
286, 293–94 (2007); Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). 
80. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271. 
81. Id. at 271–72. Chief Justice Burger explained that the expansion of juror discretion was 
permissible because it enabled jurors to bestow mercy: “[t]he statute does not extend to juries 
discretionary power to dispense mercy, and it should not be assumed that juries will disobey or nullify 
their instructions.” Id. at 279. 
82. See id. at 271. 
83. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
84. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
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Lockett, a plurality found that an Ohio statute violated the Eighth 
Amendment because it confined sentencer discretion to the consideration 
of only three specific mitigating circumstances.85 The Court held that the 
statute was constitutionally deficient because none of the enumerated 
mitigators allowed the sentencer to consider Lockett’s “character, prior 
record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor 
part in the crime” as evidence in mitigation.86 The Court explained that 
while Woodson had made clear that capital statutes preventing the 
consideration of “relevant facets of the character and record of the 
individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense” would 
be struck down as unconstitutional, it had failed to answer the question of 
what constituted a “relevant facet” of the offender or the offense.87 The 
Lockett Court took the widest possible view, mandating that capital 
sentencing statutes permit sentencers to consider as mitigating factors 
“any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.”88 
Four years later, a majority of the Court ratified the Lockett plurality in 
Eddings. The Court invalidated a death sentence because the sentencing 
judge had not considered the defendant’s background in his decision to 
impose death.89 The Court distinguished between considering a mitigating 
factor at all and ascribing little weight to it, finding that the individual 
                                                   
85. These were: whether the victim had induced or facilitated the defense; whether the defendant 
acted under duress or coercion; and whether the crime resulted primarily from the defendant’s 
psychosis or mental deficiency. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589, 594 (citing OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2929.03–
2929.04(B) (1975)). 
86. Id. at 597. Sandra Lockett was a particularly sympathetic capital defendant, as she never 
actually killed anyone. Id. at 590. Lockett and three co-defendants planned to rob a pawn shop, they 
but did not plan to kill the pawnbroker. Id. Lockett never entered the pawnshop and served only as 
the group’s getaway driver. Id. The unintentional killing occurred when the pawnbroker unexpectedly 
grabbed a co-defendant’s gun, causing it to go off. Id. Prior to trial, the prosecution offered Lockett a 
plea bargain with a maximum sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment, provided she testify 
against a co-defendant, but Lockett refused the offer. Id. at 591. Lockett had a minimal criminal 
history, with no convictions for crimes of violence. Id. at 594. Psychiatric and psychological reports 
concluded that Lockett had a high probability of rehabilitation and that she had experienced success 
in a drug treatment program. Id. The inability to consider any of these factors struck more than just 
the Justices as unfair. The trial judge himself lamented that “he had ‘no alternative, whether [he] 
like[d] the law or not’ but to impose the death penalty.” Id. 
87. Id. at 604.  
88. Id. (emphasis added). In cabining the opinion to capital cases only, the Court explained that 
capital sentences differed from noncapital ones, not only in terms of severity, but also because of their 
relative inalterability. Unlike noncapital sentences, capital sentences cannot be modified after they 
are imposed by mechanisms like parole or work furloughs. Id. at 605. 
89. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 105, 109. Although the Oklahoma sentencing statute stated that “evidence 
may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances,” the sentencing judge made statements 
indicating his belief that, as a matter of law, he could not consider the defendant’s violent upbringing 
as mitigating evidence. Id. at 106, 112–13 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980)).  
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sentencing requirement mandated consideration: “[t]he sentencer . . . may 
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they 
may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their 
consideration.”90 The Court then appeared to endorse the particular factual 
circumstances of the case as indisputably mitigating evidence, calling 
these circumstances “particularly relevant.”91 Among these were the 
defendant’s “turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and 
of severe emotional disturbance,” his young age (sixteen), and “the 
background and mental and emotional development of a 
youthful  defendant.”92 
In two later cases, the Court doubled down on its expansion of juror 
discretion by resisting states’ efforts to define mitigating circumstances in 
such a way that excluded any evidence that “might serve ‘as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.’”93 In Skipper v. South Carolina,94 the Court 
reversed a death sentence because the trial judge precluded the capital 
defendant from introducing evidence of his good behavior while 
incarcerated, despite the Court’s acknowledgement that such evidence 
had no relationship to the defendant’s culpability.95 A year later in 
Hitchcock v. Dugger,96 the Court made clear that mitigation could not be 
limited to a statutory list of enumerated factors.97 The Justices 
unanimously reversed a death sentence where the trial court had instructed 
the jury that it should consider a list of mitigating circumstances in 
reaching its sentencing decision.98 
Thus, the Court established that after the jury determined that the 
defendant was guilty of a death-eligible crime, individualized sentencing 
required an unfettering of juror discretion. To comply with Furman, a 
constitutional capital sentencing statute must include a model of juror 
discretion that is fan-shaped; that is, discretion starts off narrow as the 
sentencer determined whether a particular crime is death eligible, and it 
expands as the sentencer determines whether a particular individual was 
                                                   
90. Id. at 114–15. 
91. Id. at 115–116. 
92. Id. 
93. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604); see also 
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398 (1987). 
94. 476 U.S. 1 (1986). 
95. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4–5, 8. The Skipper Court did recognize that some limits might be put on 
a capital defendant’s ability to introduce mitigating evidence: “[w]e do not hold that all facets of the 
defendant’s ability to adjust to prison life must be treated as relevant and potentially mitigating. For 
example, we have no quarrel with the statement of the Supreme Court of South Carolina that ‘how 
often [the defendant] will take a shower’ is irrelevant to the sentencing determination.” Id. at 7 n.2.  
96. 481 U.S. 393 (1987).  
97. Id. at 398–99. 
98. Id. 
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deserving of death. The Court’s subsequent jurisprudence cemented the 
notion that constitutionality is achieved only by limiting jury discretion 
during what came to be known as the eligibility phase of the trial and 
unfettering it during what came to be known as the selection phase.99 
2. The Goals of Individualized Sentencing 
While many of the justices who championed the individualized 
sentencing requirement viewed it purely as a measure to preserve human 
dignity,100 others also saw it as a possible check on the excesses of capital 
punishment.101 These justices contended that individualized sentencing 
made death sentences more reliable and less racist. 
The notion that broad discretion to consider mitigation evidence was 
consistent with the Eighth Amendment’s heightened reliability 
requirement might seem a curious one, but the idea was first put forth by 
the more moderate justices, including Chief Justice Burger in Lockett.102 
Unlike Justices Brennan and Marshall who continued to press for 
abolition, these justices subscribed to the Gregg idea of a better death 
penalty, where punishment was meted only to the most deserving. Perfect 
reliability could only be achieved when 100% of death sentences were 
reserved for the “death worthy.”103 
In expressing his concern that the Ohio statute at issue in Lockett 
created a presumption in favor of death, Chief Justice Burger noted that 
“[o]nce a defendant is found guilty of aggravated murder with at least one 
of seven specified aggravating circumstances, the death penalty must be 
imposed” unless the jury found that one of the three enumerated factors 
                                                   
99. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U. S. 967, 971 (1994) (“Our capital punishment cases under the 
Eighth Amendment address two different aspects of the capital decision-making process: the 
eligibility decision and the selection decision.”). States must comply with requirements for each 
decision. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173–74 (2006) (“Together, our decisions in Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976) (joint 
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), establish that a state capital sentencing scheme must: 
(1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a reasoned, 
individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant’s record, personal 
characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime.”)). 
100. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (“[W]e believe that in capital cases the 
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the 
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted)). 
101. See, for example, Justice Powell’s opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310–11 
(1987) (observing that jury sentencing based on “unique characteristics of a particular criminal 
defendant” serves as a safeguard against racial prejudice). 
102. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978). 
103. Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 993, 1004–07 (1996) (discussing the death-worthiness framework and its goal 
of minimizing false positives). 
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existed beyond a reasonable doubt.104 His plurality opinion envisioned a 
wide net of sentencer mercy that captured and saved the largest possible 
number of capital defendants. The Court’s concern was not that a wide 
net would spare too many worthy of death, but that too narrow a net would 
create a “risk that the death penalty [would] be imposed in spite of factors 
which may call for a less severe penalty.”105 It was this latter risk that 
Burger found to be inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment.106 In 
widening discretion for mitigation evidence, the Lockett Court subtly 
shifted the meaning of “heightened reliability” from a concept that sought 
outcomes of death for the death-worthy and life for the life-worthy, 
equally, to a concept that focused on minimizing death sentences by erring 
on the side of preventing “false positives.”107 
Liberal justices repeatedly argued that the individualized sentencing 
requirement could operate to curb racist death sentences. In McCleskey v. 
Kemp,108 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia capital 
sentencing statute109 despite empirical research that Georgia sentencers 
factored in the race of the defendant and the race of the victim when 
bestowing death sentences.110 The now-famous “Baldus study”111 
indicated that individuals accused of killing White victims were 4.3 times 
as likely to receive a death sentence as those accused of killing Black 
victims.112 In addition, the study showed that Black defendants were 
1.1 times more likely to receive a death sentence than non-Black 
                                                   
104. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added). In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall referred 
to the Ohio capital sentencing scheme as a “virtually mandatory approach to imposition of the death 
penalty.” Id. at 620 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
105. Id. at 605 (majority opinion).  
106. Id. 
107. Garvey, supra note 103, at 993, 1004–07 (discussing the death-worthiness framework and its 
goal of minimizing false positives). In his dissenting opinion in Lockett, Justice Rehnquist 
characterized the plurality opinion as a departure from Gregg and Woodson’s mandate of non-
arbitrariness, noting that a failure to guide jurors with respect to mitigation evidence would result in 
more lighting strikes: “the new constitutional doctrine will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness 
in the imposition of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it. By encouraging defendants in 
capital cases, and presumably sentencing judges and juries, to take into consideration anything under 
the sun as a ‘mitigating circumstance,’ it will not guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash 
it.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
108. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
109. Id. at 282–83, 290–91. 
110. Id. at 287, 290–91. 
111. The “Baldus study” consisted of two statistical studies performed by Professors David C. 
Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth that analyzed over 2,000 Georgia murder cases. Id. 
at 286. In reaching their conclusions, the researchers accounted for 230 variables that could have 
provided nonracial explanations for the discrepancies. Id. at 287. Thus, the Baldus study provided 
evidence that Black defendants accused of killing White victims had the greatest likelihood of being 
sentenced to death. Id. 
112. Id. at 287.  
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defendants.113 In this 5-4 decision, multiple justices touted the 
individualized sentencing requirement as the key weapon against 
racist  outcomes. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell suggested that, but for the 
individual sentencing requirement, the racial discrepancies would likely 
be worse.114 While Powell acknowledged that “the power to be lenient 
[also] is the power to discriminate,”115 he contended that, on whole, the 
benefits of expansive juror discretion outweighed the costs.116 Praising the 
jury as “a criminal defendant’s fundamental ‘protection of life and liberty 
against race or color prejudice,’”117 Powell cited broad jury discretion as 
a boon to criminal defendants because jury decisions to acquit or to 
bestow mercy are not reviewable.118 The implications of Powell’s words 
were that the individualized sentencing requirement permitted jurors to 
rely on racial considerations to spare White defendants and defendants 
convicted of murdering Black victims, for instance, that a few 
“undeserving” individuals were receiving mercy. Powell’s opinion did not 
contemplate the equally possible outcome that there existed some number 
of “deserving” defendants who were being denied mercy on 
racial  grounds.119 
In his dissent, Justice Brennan invoked the individualized sentencing 
requirement in support of his contrary position that the Georgia capital 
sentencing scheme was unconstitutional: 
Considering the race of a defendant or victim in deciding if the 
death penalty should be imposed is completely at odds with this 
concern that an individual be evaluated as a unique human being. 
Decisions influenced by race rest in part on a categorical 
assessment of the worth of human beings according to color, 
                                                   
113. Id.  
114. Id. at 310–11 (describing juror discretion as “a criminal defendant’s fundamental ‘protection 
of life and liberty against race or color prejudice’” and capital sentencing decisions as building 
“discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system”). 
115. Id. at 312 (quoting K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1973)). 
116. Id. The majority opinion also held that Georgia did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
because McCleskey could not provide evidence of intentional racial discrimination in his individual 
case. Id. at 292–93, 299. 
117. Id. at 310 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880)). 
118. Id. at 311. 
119. In his article, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, Stephen P. 
Garvey employs the “deserving” v. “undeserving” terminology to describe the relationship between 
two hypothetical groups of capital defendants to the sentences they received. See Garvey, supra note 
103, at 993. Like Garvey’s article, this Article assumes that that a hypothetical group of offenders 
exist, who are “deserving” of the death penalty. 
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insensitive to whatever qualities the individuals in question 
may  possess.120 
Justice Brennan cautioned that discretion was “a means, not an end” and 
contended that the individualized sentencing requirement should function 
as a bulwark against racist outcomes: “[discretion] is bestowed in order to 
permit the sentencer to ‘trea[t] each defendant in a capital case with that 
degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual.’”121 
Elements of both of these views appeared in Justice Stevens’ dissent in 
1993’s Graham v. Collins.122 Responding to Justice Thomas’s claim that 
too much juror discretion could permit racist decision-making, Justice 
Stevens contended that individualized sentencing required that jurors have 
the opportunity to consider specific mitigating evidence about both the 
individual crime and the individual offender.123 According to Stevens, the 
jury’s focus on specific individual characteristics “reduce[d] still further 
the chance that the decision will be based on irrelevant factors such as 
race.”124 Stevens explained that when a statute excluded “relevant” 
mitigating evidence, “there is more, not less, reason to believe that the 
sentencer will be left to rely on irrational considerations like 
racial  animus.”125 
As the Furman ruling grew more distant and liberal justices’ hopes of 
abolishing the death penalty dimmed, they grew to embrace the 
individualized sentencing requirement’s emphasis on procedural justice. 
If America must have a death penalty, individualized sentencing could 
ensure that it did as little damage as possible. 
C. Navigating the Tension in the Eighth Amendment’s 
Twin  Requirements 
Scholars have long noted that a tension exists between the unfettered 
discretion that became synonymous with the individualized sentencing 
requirement and Furman’s mandate against arbitrary outcomes.126 
                                                   
120. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
121. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).  
122. 506 U.S. 461 (1993). 
123. Id. at 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
124. Id.  
125. Id.  
126. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, “Black Box Decisions” on Life or Death—If They’re Arbitrary, Don’t 
Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067, 1080 
(1991); Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented 
Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323 (1992) (arguing that due to tension between ensuring 
individualized sentencing and limiting arbitrariness, the Court has not resolved whether a sentence 
should concern a defendant’s culpability or general deserts); Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: 
Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 
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Professor Vivian Berger has compared the Eighth Amendment 
requirements of consistency and individualized sentencing to conjoined 
twins—“locked at the hip but straining uncomfortably in opposite 
directions.”127 Professor Scott Sundby has explored “the Lockett paradox” 
and has examined the question of whether the tension is irreconcilable.128 
In their comprehensive book about the Supreme Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence, Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker recently described the 
“central tension in American death penalty law: its simultaneous 
command that states cabin discretion of who shall die while facilitating 
discretion of who shall live.”129 
This tension was not lost on the justices, several of whom had 
commented on it as early as Lockett.130 These concerns were brought to 
the forefront in a series of cases where the justices explored whether states 
could place any limits on a jury’s consideration of mitigation evidence. 
During this time, clear camps on the Court emerged. The more 
conservative justices favored non-arbitrariness, seeking to limit juror 
discretion by bolstering state power to narrow consideration of mitigation 
evidence.131 The more liberal justices took the opposite approach, finding 
that individualized sentencing not only forbade a state’s capital sentencing 
statute from precluding the consideration of relevant mitigating evidence, 
but also required state statutes to permit jurors to “give effect to” that 
evidence.132 Justice Stevens maintained that the two requirements were 
not only reconcilable, but they were also both critical to achieving a 
                                                   
1147, 1206 (1991); see also STEIKER & STEIKER, COURTING DEATH, supra note 53, at 165–66; 
Garvey, supra note 103, at 995–1002 (discussing the “paradox” created by the dual aims of 
consistency and individualized sentencing).  
127. See Berger, supra note 126, at 1080. 
128. See Sundby, supra note 126, at 1206 (“For while the cases necessitate different approaches to 
sentencer discretion, Furman narrowing it and Lockett expanding it, they share the goal of identifying 
which defendants are within the state’s power to execute under the eighth amendment. The crucial 
question, therefore, is whether the means of implementing their principles invariably are drawn 
into  conflict.”). 
129. See STEIKER & STEIKER, COURTING DEATH, supra note 53, at 165. 
130. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 631 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he new 
constitutional doctrine will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of sentences, 
but will codify and institutionalize it. By encouraging defendants in capital cases, and presumably 
sentencing judges and juries, to take into consideration anything under the sun as a ‘mitigating 
circumstance,’ it will not guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it.”). 
131. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368, 373 (1993); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 
299, 301, 305 (1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. at 639, 
649–51 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 
487 U.S. 164, 174–75, 181 (1988); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543 (1987). 
132. Penry I, 492 U.S. 302, 322–33 (1989); see also Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 369, 384 
(1988); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398 (1987); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 73–78 
(1987).  
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constitutional capital punishment scheme.133 The most extreme members 
of both camps ultimately drew the same conclusions in favor of opposite 
results. Justices Scalia and Thomas found the individualized sentencing 
requirement to be irreconcilable with Furman’s aim of consistency and 
repeatedly argued to abandon individualized sentencing.134 Justice 
Blackmun agreed that the two requirements were irreconcilable, but 
argued that the only solution was abandonment of the death 
penalty  altogether.135 
Justice O’Connor was the first to attempt to reconcile the tension, 
introducing the concept of the sentencing decision as “a reasoned moral 
response” that encompassed both logic and some degree of emotion.136 In 
O’Connor’s framing, states could properly place some standards on the 
sentencer’s consideration of mitigation evidence by urging a dispassionate 
view of that evidence: that is, by imposing reason and/or reigning 
in  emotion.137 
Justice O’Connor’s conception of the mitigation question has 
undergirded the Court’s individualized sentencing jurisprudence for the 
last thirty years. In her majority opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh138 in 1989, 
O’Connor invalidated the Texas “special issues”—which asked jurors to 
determine whether the defendant acted deliberately, whether he was likely 
to be a continuing threat to the community, and whether his response was 
unreasonable in response to any provocation by the deceased—because 
she found that they prevented jurors from giving mitigating effect to the 
evidence that defense counsel presented to argue for a sentence of life 
without parole.139 
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, pronounced the goals of non-
arbitrariness and individualized sentencing fundamentally 
                                                   
133. Walton, 497 U.S. at 716–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
134. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 493–95 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Walton, 497 
U.S. at 664–66 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Penry I, 492 U.S. at 359–60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
135. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1142–46 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
136. Brown, 479 U.S. at 544 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
137. In Brown, the Court upheld California’s instruction that jurors could not base their penalty 
phase verdict on sympathy. 479 U.S. at 543 (majority opinion). The four dissenters in Brown rejected 
this limitation because they believed that the very essence of mitigation evidence is to elicit sympathy: 
“[i]n forbidding the sentencer to take sympathy into account, this language on its face precludes 
precisely the response that a defendant’s evidence of character and background is designed to elicit, 
thus effectively negating the intended effect of the Court’s requirement that all mitigating evidence 
be considered.” Id. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The instruction thus foreclosed the defendant’s 
“only hope of gaining mercy from the sentencer.” Id. at 561. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun rejected 
O’Connor’s idea of sentencing as a reasoned moral response, arguing that while sentencing decisions 
could be rational, they more often resulted from feelings of mercy or sympathy that were 
unquestionably emotional. Id. at 561–62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
138. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).  
139. Id. at 307. 
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irreconcilable.140 He mocked O’Connor’s characterization of the 
sentencing decision as a reasoned moral response, chiding “reason has 
nothing to do with it, the Court having eliminated the structure that 
required reason. It is an unguided, emotional ‘moral response’ that the 
Court demands be allowed—an outpouring of personal reaction to all the 
circumstances of a defendant’s life and personality, an unfocused 
sympathy.”141 Scalia then warned that the Penry decision would reproduce 
the Furman-era sentencing patterns that formerly concerned the Court: 
“‘[f]reakishly’ and ‘wantonly,’ . . . have been rebaptized ‘reasoned moral 
response.’”142 Finally, he rejected the notion that there was value in a fan-
shaped discretion model: “[t]he Court cannot seriously believe that 
rationality and predictability can be achieved, and capriciousness avoided, 
by ‘narrow[ing] a sentencer’s discretion to impose the death sentence,’ but 
expanding his discretion ‘to decline to impose the death sentence[.]’”143 
Ultimately, Justice Scalia announced that he would no longer apply the 
line of cases that forbade states from limiting juror discretion to consider 
mitigation evidence.144 Scalia argued that this “Woodson-Lockett 
principle,” departed in an unjustified way from Furman’s narrowing 
principle,145 pronouncing the two as fundamentally incompatible as “the 
Allies and the Axis Powers in World War II.”146 
                                                   
140. Id. at 354–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that O’Connor’s majority opinion “requir[ed] 
individualized consideration to displace the channeling of discretion”). 
141. Id. at 359.  
142. Id. at 360.  
143. Id. at 359–60 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987)). Scalia viewed Penry 
I as a misreading of Lockett, which he contended merely prevented states from precluding the 
introduction of evidence related to the defendant’s crime or character. Id. at 357–60. No Lockett 
violation existed because “Texas permits all mitigating factors to be considered, though only for 
purposes of answering the three Special Issues (and there is no question that the specific mitigation 
offered was relevant to at least one of them).” Id. at 357; see also id. at 358–59 (“In providing for 
juries to consider all mitigating circumstances insofar as they bear upon (1) deliberateness, (2) future 
dangerousness, and (3) provocation, it seems to me Texas had adopted a rational scheme that meets 
the two concerns of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
144. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. at 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part), overruled on 
other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In Walton, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Arizona capital sentencing scheme, which placed the burden of establishing 
mitigating circumstances on the defendant and required judges to impose death if they found the 
existence of one or more aggravating circumstances and “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently 
substantial to call for leniency.” Id. at 644 (majority opinion). 
145. Id. at 662 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“In short, the practice which in Furman had been described 
as the discretion to sentence to death and pronounced constitutionally prohibited, was in Woodson and 
Lockett renamed the discretion not to sentence to death and pronounced constitutionally required.”). 
146. Id. at 664; see also id. at 666 (“[T]he question remains why the Constitution demands that the 
aggravating standards and mitigating standards be accorded opposite treatment. It is impossible to 
understand why.”). Scalia explained that he did not take issue with the requirement of individualized 
sentencing per se, but merely with the Court’s prohibition on rationalizing the process: “[t]he issue is 
whether, in the process of the individualized sentencing determination, the society may specify which 
factors are relevant, and which are not—whether it may insist upon a rational scheme in which all 
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Justice Thomas expounded on Scalia’s concerns about the 
expansiveness with which the Court had begun interpreting the 
individualized sentencing requirement.147 Thomas agreed with Scalia that 
the tension between the Court’s requirement that states narrow discretion 
for aggravating circumstances but widen it for mitigating circumstances 
was untenable.148 Thomas contended that unfettered discretion in the 
consideration of mitigation evidence increased the opportunity not only 
for arbitrary sentencing outcomes, but also for racist ones: “[t]o withhold 
the death penalty out of sympathy for a defendant who is a member of a 
favored group is no different from a decision to impose the penalty on the 
basis of negative bias, and it matters not how narrow the class of death-
eligible defendants or crimes.”149 Thomas argued that by deeming the 
sentencing decision a moral one, the Court enshrined a mushy quality to 
capital sentencing that permitted racial animus: 
[B]eware the word ‘moral’ when used in an opinion of this Court. 
This word is a vessel of nearly infinite capacity—just as it may 
allow the sentencer to express benevolence, it may allow him to 
cloak latent animus. A judgment that some will consider a ‘moral 
response’ may secretly be based on caprice or even 
outright  prejudice.150 
In contrast to the conservative wing, Justice Stevens found the tension 
between non-arbitrariness and individualized sentencing easily 
reconcilable if one conceives of the law as applied to all homicide crimes 
as a pyramid with three planes.151 The possible punishment for each crime 
increases as one moves up the pyramid.152 The first plane at the base of 
                                                   
sentencers making the individualized determinations apply the same standard.” Id. at 665–66. 
According to Scalia, the Court’s extension of individualized sentencing to prevent states from guiding 
consideration of mitigation evidence could only lead to arbitrary outcomes. Id. at 666–67. 
(“[R]andomness and ‘freakishness’ are even more evident in a system that requires aggravating 
factors to be found in great detail, since it permits sentencers to accord different treatment, for 
whatever mitigating reasons they wish, not only to two different murderers, but to two murderers 
whose crimes have been found to be of similar gravity.”). 
147. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
148. Id. In Thomas’s view, Lockett and Eddings sought to preserve a fair, adversarial process by 
guaranteeing the admissibility of the evidence that the defense contended was mitigating. Id. at 490. When the 
Penry I Court prevented the State of Texas from guiding the jury’s consideration of the defense mitigation 
through the special issues, it rendered the decision to spare a defendant standard-less. Id. at 493–94. 
149. Id. at 495. 
150. Id. at 494 (arguing that by “throw[ing] open the back door to arbitrary and irrational 
sentencing,” the Court had turned Furman on its head). 
151. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. at 639, 716–18 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled on 
other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Justice Stevens borrowed the pyramid model 
from the Georgia Supreme Court, as quoted by the Court in Zant v. Stephens. Id. at 716 (quoting Zant 
v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983)). 
152. Id. at 716. 
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the pyramid separates homicides from killings generally; the middle plane 
consists of homicides eligible for the death penalty; and the plane just 
below the apex consists of cases selected for death.153 If the sentencer’s 
discretion is inversely proportional to punishment, for instance, fan-
shaped, the twin objectives of non-arbitrariness and individualized 
sentencing are achievable.154 Justice Stevens explained that Scalia’s 
analysis was reductive: 
Justice Scalia ignores the difference between the base of the 
pyramid and its apex. A rule that forbids unguided discretion at 
the base is completely consistent with one that requires discretion 
at the apex. After narrowing the class of cases to those at the tip 
of the pyramid, it is then appropriate to allow the sentencer 
discretion to show mercy based on individual mitigating 
circumstances in the cases that remain.155 
To Justice Stevens, the Eighth Amendment’s heightened reliability 
requirement justified the disparate treatment: a fan-shaped discretion 
model minimized the number of death sentences to the class of defendants 
most “worthy” of death.156 
Unlike his liberal ally, Justice Blackmun eventually had enough of this 
debate. In his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins,157 
Blackmun agreed with his most conservative colleagues that the goals of 
individualized sentencing and non-arbitrariness were irreconcilable: 
“[e]xperience has taught us that the constitutional goal of eliminating 
arbitrariness and discrimination from the administration of death, . . . can 
never be achieved without compromising an equally essential component 
of fundamental fairness—individualized sentencing.”158 Unlike Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, Blackmun’s solution was not to abandon the 
individualized sentencing requirement or to allow states to limit discretion 
to consider mitigation evidence.159 Justice Blackmun decreed that the only 
                                                   
153. Id. at 716–17.  
154. Id. at 716–18. 
155. Id. at 718.  
156. Id. at 718–19.  
157. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).  
158. Id. at 1144 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
159. Id. at 1145. Justice Scalia’s opinion supporting the denial of certiorari in Callins specifically 
responded to Justice Blackmun, agreeing that while the two requirements of consistency and 
individualized sentencing were fatally in conflict, the text of the Constitution and the Framers’ intent 
clearly contemplated a system of capital punishment. Id. at 1141–42 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia 
proposes another solution: “[s]urely a different conclusion commends itself—to wit, that at least one 
of these judicially announced irreconcilable commands which cause the Constitution to prohibit what 
its text explicitly permits must be wrong.” Id. at 1142. 
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fair solution was to abandon the death penalty entirely.160 Shortly after his 
Callins dissent, Blackmun retired; no other justice took up his argument. 
Instead, in the years following Callins, the Court jumped back into the 
weeds on the individualized sentencing debate and issued what Chief 
Justice Roberts later referred to as “a dog’s breakfast of divided, 
conflicting, and ever-changing analyses.”161 The Court embarked on a 
case-by-case basis, determining whether particular state jury instructions 
precluded jury consideration of mitigation evidence.162 In many of these 
cases, Justices Scalia and Thomas underscored their opposition to the 
disparate treatment of jury consideration of mitigators and 
aggravators163—often simply citing, without elaboration, to their prior 
concurring and dissenting opinions.164 
This approach culminated in 2007’s holdings in Abdul-Kabir v. 
Quarterman165 and Brewer v. Quarterman,166 where Justice Stevens’s 
majority opinion emphasized Penry’s mandate that jurors not be 
                                                   
160. Id. at 1145–46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
161. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 267 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Roberts 
noted that the majority opinion relied on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Franklin instead of the 
plurality opinion that “rejected the argument that a jury must be permitted to give ‘independent’ effect 
to mitigating evidence—beyond the special issues.” Id. at 269. 
162. See generally, e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004) (holding, on habeas review, that 
the petitioner was entitled to a certificate of appealability because he had a colorable Penry claim 
where special issues did not allow jurors to give mitigating effect to his low IQ score); Smith v. Texas, 
543 U.S. 37 (2004) (finding the Texas jury instruction that permitted jurors to nullify their sentencing 
decision based on an effective mitigation presentation violated the Eighth Amendment because it 
created a logical impossibility for jurors to follow opposing instructions and did not adequately allow 
jurors to give effect to mitigation); Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (holding, on 
habeas review, that a supplemental mitigation instruction did not allow jurors to give effect to 
mitigating evidence of mental retardation when the special issues were the same as those in Penry I 
and the mitigation instruction was a best a confusing directive to nullify); see also Smith v. Texas 
(Smith II), 550 U.S. 297 (2007) (finding that the petitioner’s Penry claim was properly preserved); 
Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006) (holding that there was no reasonable likelihood that jurors in 
penalty phase interpreted trial court’s instruction to preclude consideration of petitioner’s forward-
looking mitigation evidence—specifically, that he would lead a constructive life if incarcerated rather 
than executed); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005) (applying AEDPA deference to hold that the 
ruling of the California Supreme Court—that the jury instruction plus the prosecutor’s misstatements 
of law did not preclude the jury from considering evidence of post-arrest religious conversion—did 
not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law). 
163. See, e.g., Ayers, 549 U.S. at 24–25 (Scalia, J., concurring); Brown, 544 U.S. at 147 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Tennard, 542 U.S. at 293–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 294–95 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Smith, 543 U.S. at 49 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Penry II, 532 U.S. at 810 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing Penry I, 492 U.S. 302, 355–56 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
164. See, e.g., Smith, 543 U.S. at 49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 
639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002)); Ayers, 549 U.S. at 24–25 (Scalia, J., concurring); Brown, 544 U.S. at 147 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (citing Walton, 497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
165. 550 U.S. 233 (2007). 
166. 550 U.S. 286 (2007). 
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precluded from “giving effect” to mitigation evidence.167 In these cases, 
the Court found that the Texas special issues precluded meaningful 
consideration of mitigating evidence because neither the deliberateness 
nor the future dangerous issue contemplated the defendant’s mitigation 
evidence.168 Writing for five justices, Justice Stevens made clear that the 
fact that the special issues allowed the jury to give effect to some of the 
mitigating evidence was not sufficient; the jury must be able to “fully 
consider” and “give meaningful effect” to all of that evidence.169 The 
Court resurrected Penry’s command that “the evidence be permitted its 
mitigating force beyond the scope of the special issues”170—that it be 
given, not “sufficient mitigating effect,” but “full effect.”171 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing on behalf of four dissenting justices, 
argued that the individualized sentencing requirement did not demand that 
juries be able “to give effect to mitigating evidence in every conceivable 
manner,” and effectively embraced the case-by-case approach.172 Roberts 
did not join in the second dissent, which was authored by Justice Scalia 
and joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. Scalia confirmed that the debate 
concerning the individualized sentencing requirement was alive and well, 
stating, “I remain of the view ‘that limiting a jury’s discretion to consider 
all mitigating evidence does not violate the Eighth Amendment.’”173 
By 2007, the divide in the Court remained clear. The liberal justices, 
led by Justice Stevens, remained champions of the individualized 
sentencing requirement and sought to minimize state restrictions on juror 
discretion to consider mitigating circumstances, with an eye toward 
                                                   
167. See Penry I, 492 U.S. at 318. 
168. The Court found that Abdul-Kabir’s evidence of his traumatic childhood and self-control 
problems did not rebut the special issues of future dangerousness or deliberation; instead, it provided 
jurors with “an entirely different reason for not imposing a death sentence.” Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 
259. Similarly, in Brewer’s case, jurors were only told to assess his future dangerousness and 
deliberateness; they were given no avenue to consider “any independent concern that, given Brewer’s 
troubled background, he may not be deserving of a death sentence.” Brewer, 550 U.S. at 294. Because 
the Court decided both of these cases in the federal habeas context, its actual holdings were that the 
state courts opinions should be overturned as unreasonable applications of Penry I. Abdul-Kabir, 550 
U.S. at 259; Brewer, 550 U.S. at 289. 
169. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 253–60. 
170. Id. at 257. 
171. Brewer, 550 U.S. at 295. 
172. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 277 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 
350, 372–73 (1993)). Roberts ended glibly, criticizing Justice Stevens’ overreach:  
Still, perhaps there is no reason to be unduly glum. After all, today the author of a dissent issued 
in 1988 writes two majority opinions concluding that the views expressed in that dissent actually 
represented ‘clearly established’ federal law at that time. So there is hope yet for the views 
expressed in this dissent, not simply down the road, but tunc pro nunc. Encouraged by the 
majority’s determination that the future can change the past, I respectfully dissent.” Id. at 280. 
173. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia then questioned the majority’s good faith: “nothing of a legal 
nature has changed since Johnson. What has changed are the moral sensibilities of the majority of the 
Court.” Id. at 283–84. 
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sparing more individuals from a death sentence. The moderate justices 
accepted the requirement but contended that states could limit juror 
discretion in certain circumstances. The most conservative justices, 
including Justices Scalia and Thomas, and, later, Justice Alito, believed 
states should be permitted to narrow juror discretion to consider only 
certain, specific mitigators, just as they had with aggravators; these three 
justices believed the Court’s individualized sentencing jurisprudence had 
no constitutional basis and feared that expansion of the doctrine would 
result in the kind of arbitrary and racist results the Furman Court strove 
to prevent. 
II. REPEATING THE SINS OF THE PAST: THE MODERN 
DEATH PENALTY 
For the last forty years, since the Court’s decision in Woodson, capital 
sentencing statutes have implemented the individualized sentencing 
requirement. The question is, to what extent has individualized sentencing 
been effective? Are the results those predicted by first the moderate and 
then liberal justices: that the requirement would result in fewer death 
sentences or a death penalty that is less racially discriminatory? Or were 
Justice Scalia and Thomas correct that the expansive discretion read into 
the individualized sentencing requirement would allow arbitrary and 
racist outcomes to continue to plague the death penalty? 
In this Part, I argue that common practices that result in 
disproportionately White juries have limited the efficacy of the 
individualized sentencing requirement. Consequently, at best, the 
individualized sentencing requirement is a fig leaf for justice, covering up 
the ugly reality of disparate sentencing by encouraging the evaluation of 
the individual defendant irrespective of his peers. At worst, the 
requirement legitimizes a systemically racist death penalty, by falsely 
insisting that each capital defendant has been evaluated as an individual 
human being. 
A. Pre-Furman Outcomes Persist in the Modern Application of the 
Death Penalty 
The identity of those chosen to live and those chosen to die has not 
changed substantially in the post-Furman era. In the past forty years, 
capital punishment has consistently exhibited arbitrary and racist 
outcomes. A mere ten years into the renewed experiment with death, the 
results were not promising. As the Baldus study presented in McCleskey 
v. Kemp demonstrated, the Georgia capital sentencing scheme deemed 
constitutional in Gregg was producing racially discriminatory outcomes 
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throughout the 1970s.174 That study demonstrated that the most salient 
determiner of death was the race of the victim, with individuals convicted 
of killing White victims 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as 
those convicted of killing Black victims.175 Race of the defendant also 
mattered: Black defendants were 1.1 times more likely to receive a death 
sentence than non-Black defendants.176 
Another decade showed results no less discouraging. In his dissent 
from a denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins, Justice Blackmun 
famously proclaimed that he would no longer “tinker with the machinery 
of death.”177 Blackmun’s decision was informed, in part, by evidence that 
race continued to be a factor in sentencing outcomes: “[e]ven under the 
most sophisticated death penalty statutes, race continues to play a major 
role in determining who shall live and who shall die.”178 Blackmun noted 
that in the years since the Baldus study, death penalty proponents had 
provided no evidence that its results were inaccurate or that they applied 
only to Georgia.179 Moreover, Blackmun had no confidence that the 
Court’s jurisprudence had reduced arbitrariness: 
The basic question—does the system accurately and consistently 
determine which defendants ‘deserve’ to die?—cannot be 
answered in the affirmative . . . . The problem is that the 
inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system 
that we know must wrongly kill some defendants, a system that 
fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death 
required by the Constitution.180 
Indeed, the overwhelming majority of empirical studies between 1990 
and 2014 confirmed that the death penalty remains racially 
discriminatory, finding that death sentences are more probable when the 
victim is White, the defendant is Black, or both.181 A subsequent study by 
David Baldus in 1998 found that jurors were more likely to find the 
existence of aggravating circumstances in cases involving White victims 
and Black defendants: “the presence of a nonblack victim simply 
                                                   
174. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987). 
175. Id. at 287.  
176. Id.  
177. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
178. Id. at 1153. 
179. Id. at 1154. 
180. Id. at 1145–46. 
181. Ross Kleinstuber, McCleskey and the Lingering Problem of “Race,” in RACE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY: THE LEGACY OF MCCLESKEY V. KEMP 38 (David P. Keys & R.J. Maratea eds., 
2016) (indicating that thirty-two of thirty-six empirical studies on racial discrimination in capital 
punishment concluded that death sentences were more likely imposed in circumstances where the 
victim was White, the defendant was Black, or both). 
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enhances the average juror’s perception of the deathworthiness of the 
offense.”182 A 2011 summary of American Bar Association studies in 
eight death penalty states concluded that the system of capital punishment 
in each of the eight states exhibited significant racial disparities, 
especially when factoring in the race of the victim.183 Most recently, a 
Washington State study concluded that jurors are four and a half times 
more likely to recommend a death sentence for Black defendants than for 
White defendants.184 
Not only has the unfettered discretion given to jurors assessing 
mitigation evidence failed to cure the death penalty’s racial imbalance, it 
has also failed to decrease the class of individuals sentenced to death in 
the post-Furman years. As far back as Lockett, the Court indicated that a 
goal of individualized sentencing was to minimize the number of false 
positives who received a death sentence by shrinking the class 
generally.185 Justice Blackmun similarly contended in Callins that there 
was one value in the individualized sentencing requirement: “[i]t simply 
reduces, rather than eliminates, the number of people subject to 
arbitrary  sentencing.”186 
Yet even this modest achievement is questionable. Until recent years, 
the number of executions has continued to steadily increase. Capital 
punishment scholar Franklin Zimring observed that “[b]y the year 2000 
the volume of executions by American states had bounced back to levels 
quite close to those experienced during the early 1950s.”187 Zimring noted 
that this statistic, in isolation, is misleading because it fails to consider the 
dramatic increase in individuals awaiting execution.188 In 1953, although 
states executed sixty-two individuals, only 131 awaited execution.189 In 
2000, states executed eighty-five prisoners; however, the number of 
individuals on Death Row numbered more than 3,500.190 Thus, while the 
number of annual executions mimicked pre-Furman levels, the number of 
                                                   
182. David Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An 
Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 
1722 (1998) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination]. 
183. Gennaro F. Vito & George E. Higgins, Capital Sentencing and Structural Racism: The Source 
of Bias, in RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE LEGACY OF MCCLESKEY V. KEMP 74 (David P. Keys 
& R. J. Maratea eds., 2016). 
184. Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, Race, Death, and Justice: Capital Sentencing in 
Washington State, 1981–2014, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 77, 100 (2016). 
185. Lockett, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978). 
186. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1152 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
187. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 6 (2003) 
[hereinafter ZIMRING, CONTRADICTIONS]. 
188. Id. at 7. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
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death sentences had increased more than twenty-five times. Professor 
Zimring concluded that, despite the Supreme Court’s efforts to craft 
procedural safeguards, “there are no observable differences between 
outcomes in the ‘standardless’ discretion disapproved of in Furman and 
the ‘guided discretion’ upheld in Gregg.”191 While the number of death 
sentences and executions has declined significantly since 2000, scholars 
typically attribute this phenomenon, not to changes in the Court’s 
interpretation of the individualized sentencing requirement—but to 
increased awareness of wrongful convictions and financial burdens.192 
These studies reveal that the modern death penalty continues to result 
in the same racist and arbitrary outcomes that it exhibited in its pre-
Furman days.193 There is no evidence to suggest that the individualized 
sentencing requirement has had the effects for which the liberal justices 
had hoped – either in sparing those least deserving of the death penalty or 
in encouraging jurors to see the humanity of individual defendants beyond 
their mere membership in a racial group.194 While the liberal justices 
considered the only harm of the individualized sentencing requirement as 
being the sparing of a small number of individuals deserving of death, it 
is at least as likely that individuals deserving of mercy have received 
death  instead. 
B. Jury Composition and Modern Death Sentences 
Numerous studies have shown that the racial composition of the jury 
matters with respect to whether the death penalty is imposed. While most 
of these results are attributed to unconscious bias,195 a 2007 study found 
                                                   
191. Id. at 9. 
192. Richard C. Dieter, Racial Bias and Capital Punishment, in RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: 
THE LEGACY OF MCCLESKEY V. KEMP 3 (David P. Keys & R. J. Maratea eds., 2016). 
193. See, e.g., David P. Keys & John F. Galliher, Nothing Succeeds Like Failure: Race, 
Decisionmaking, and Proportionality in Oklahoma Homicide Trials, 1973–2010, in RACE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY: THE LEGACY OF MCCLESKEY V. KEMP 126 (David P. Keys & R.J. Maratea, eds., 
2016) (arguing that “Oklahoma’s administration of capital punishment, irrespective of the reforms 
approved in Gregg, is not fundamentally different in character from the pre-Furman conditions 
(1915–1972), but has merely added a thin veil of procedural correctness”). 
194. This is not to say that the individualized sentencing requirement has caused these results. See 
Sundby, supra note 126, at 1182 (“Substantial evidence exists that the death penalty is not being 
applied evenhandedly, but the inconsistency appears to be entering through a variety of portals, such 
as the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, inadequately defined aggravating circumstances, vague 
sentencing instructions, the lack of meaningful appellate proportionality review, sentencers’ racial 
attitudes and the quality of defense representation.”). 
195. See, e.g., R. J. Maratea, Overcoming Moral Peril: How Empirical Research Can Affect Death 
Penalty Debates, in RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE LEGACY OF MCCLESKEY V. KEMP 64 
(David P. Keys & R. J. Maratea eds., 2016) (“[T]he justice system is so historically embedded in 
inequality it reproduces subtle yet disparate outcomes despite our best efforts to root out 
discrimination and achieve fairness.”). 
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that Whites actually became “more supportive” of capital punishment 
“upon learning that it discriminates against blacks.”196 All-White juries 
are the most likely to impose death sentences, doing so in 75% of cases 
involving Black defendants and White victims.197 In what William J. 
Bowers has termed the “‘white male dominance’ effect,” juries with 
greater numbers of White males tend to vote for death in cases involving 
Black defendants and White victims.198 Bowers’ findings demonstrated 
that a jury with five or more White male members “dramatically 
increase[s]” the likelihood of a death sentence in these cases.199 
Conversely, the “‘black male presence’ effect” indicates the presence of 
at least one Black man on a capital jury tends to turn the tide against death 
in capital cases with Black defendants and White victims.200 Bowers 
found that when at least one of the jurors was an African-American male, 
the jury imposed a death sentence in only 42.9% of cases, compared to 
71.9% when none of the jurors were African Americans.201 
Many scholars have noted that African Americans’ mistrust of the 
death penalty often stems from their history and life experiences.202 From 
the earliest days of the capital punishment in America, the death penalty 
was disproportionately applied against African Americans. Southern 
Whites used the death penalty as another means of social control, 
codifying scores of crimes that could earn enslaved people the death 
penalty, but limiting capital crimes for Whites to just a few.203 Professor 
Zimring has drawn a connection to the modern death penalty and the 
southern lynching of African Americans following the Civil War.204 Of 
the 455 men executed for rape between 1930 and 1972, 405, or 89.5%, 
were Black.205 No White man has ever been executed for the non-
                                                   
196. Id. at 52 (citing Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, Persuasion and Resistance, Race and the Death 
Penalty in America, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 996–1012 (2007)). 
197. William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Compositions, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 193 n.104 (2001) 
[hereinafter Bowers et al., Death Sentencing].  
198. Id. at 192, 193.  
199. Id.  
200. Id.  
201. Id. at 193–94.  
202. See, e.g., STEIKER & STEIKER, COURTING DEATH, supra note 53, at 17–26; ZIMRING, 
CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 187, at 89–118. 
203. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Coker v. Georgia: Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past, in 
DEATH PENALTY STORIES 191 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009) (observing that 
Virginia had over sixty capital crimes for which enslaved people were death eligible, but far fewer 
crimes for which Whites were death eligible). 
204. ZIMRING, CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 187, at 89–118. 
205. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Case against the Death Penalty, in CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: 
CONFRONTING THE PRISON CRISIS 215 (Elihu Rosenblatt ed., 1996); see also Marvin E. Wolfgang & 
Marc Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
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homicide rape of a Black woman or child.206 With this history in mind, 
modern African Americans are more likely than Whites to believe that 
racial discrimination infects the criminal justice system generally, as well 
as the imposition of the death penalty, in particular.207 
In aggregate, jurors of different races assess sentencing evidence 
differently. Black jurors are more likely to have lingering doubts about 
the defendant’s culpability and to factor these doubts into their sentencing 
decision.208 Black jurors are also more likely to conclude that the 
defendant is genuinely remorseful, particularly in cases involving Black 
defendants and White victims, while White jurors are especially unlikely 
to conclude the defendant is remorseful when he is Black.209 Blacks and 
Whites also exhibit different conclusions about a capital defendant’s 
future dangerousness. White jurors believe Black defendants are more 
likely to be dangerous than White ones, while Black jurors believe that 
any defendant who kills a Black victim is more likely to be dangerous.210 
In a 2009 study, Professors Mona Lynch and Craig Haney observed a 
race-of-the-defendant effect in jurors’ assessment of mitigation 
evidence.211 The study tested simulated jurors’ receptivity to classic 
categories of mitigation evidence: a defendant’s history of child abuse, 
psychiatric problems, substance abuse, and familial love.212 In each of the 
categories, jurors were more likely to inappropriately interpret the 
evidence as aggravating—and thus as a reason to impose a death 
sentence—for Black defendants than for White defendants.213 Baldus 
observed that the race of the victim may also determine jurors’ receptivity 
to specific mitigators.214 Juries were more likely to find the defendant’s 
                                                   
SCI. 119, 123 (1973) (citing Marvin E. Wolfgang, Testimony at Hearings before the Subcommittee 
of the Committee on the Judiciary (Mar. 16, 1972)). 
206. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Louisiana, and the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
554 U.S. 407 (2008) (No. 07-343), 2008 WL 503591. 
207. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Death Qualification in Black and White: Racialized Decision 
Making and Death-Qualified Juries, 40 L. & POL’Y 148, 152 (2018) [hereinafter Lynch & Haney, 
Death Qualification]. 
208. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing, supra note 197, at 207–08. 
209. Id. at 215–16. Black jurors cite remorsefulness as the primary factor in their decision to grant 
mercy in cases involving White defendants and Black victims. Id. at 218. 
210. Id. at 222–23. White jurors cite a defendant’s future dangerousness as the primary reason to 
impose the death penalty in cases involving Black defendants and White victims. Id. at 225–26. 
211. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided 
Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 351 (2000) [hereinafter 
Lynch & Haney, Discrimination]. 
212. Id. at 352.  
213. Id. at 352–53. 
214. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination, supra note 182, at 1718–19. 
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age to be mitigating when the victim was Black.215 Similarly, they were 
more receptive to a “catchall” mitigation argument, which allowed them 
to consider any additional evidence relating to the circumstances of the 
crime or the character of the defendant, when the victim was Black.216 
Explanations for jurors’ racist behavior depend on the concept of 
stereotype activation, where unconscious bias fueled by White supremacy 
infiltrates decision-making.217 Current social psychology research reveals 
that individuals subconsciously construct positive or negative associations 
based on group membership in, among other things, a particular race.218 
Scholars have noted that in the United States, this commonly takes the 
form of associating Blackness with negative traits, such as criminality and 
deviance, and Whiteness with positive traits, such as good citizenship and 
a propensity for victimhood.219 Environmental cues activate these 
stereotypes, often unconsciously; in the capital jury context, race images 
trigger these pre-existing notions of criminality or victimhood.220 
Attitudes based on stereotypical thinking lead to confirmation bias, where 
individuals discount contrary evidence: “[e]vidence supporting our 
attitudes is seen as more compelling than evidence that disagrees with 
our  attitudes.”221 
Several factors may temper racist decision-making.222 First, the 
composition of the jury plays a role.223 A diverse jury motivates 
individuals to avoid engaging in racist behavior—hence why the presence 
                                                   
215. Id. at 1719. 
216. Id. at 1646, 1719. 
217. Jamie L. Flexon, Addressing Contradictions with the Social Psychology of Capital Juries and 
Racial Bias, in RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE LEGACY OF MCCLESKEY V. KEMP 113–19 
(David P. Keys & R. J. Maratea eds., 2016) (discussing stereotype activation). 
218. See generally KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY AT OHIO STATE UNIV., 
STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2014 (2014), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/X94H-MZMM] (cataloguing 
thirty years of social science research on unconscious racial bias). 
219. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing, supra note 197, at 219 (“[C]ulturally rooted racial 
stereotypes may tend to demonize and dehumanize blacks accused of lethal violence by portraying 
them as especially dangerous.”); Flexon, supra note 217, at 113.  
220. Flexon, supra note 217, at 114; see also BRYAN C. EDELMAN, RACIAL PREJUDICE, JUROR 
EMPATHY, AND SENTENCING IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 2 (2006) (“Jurors bring their pre-existing 
schemas and attitudes toward the defendant and victim into the sentencing phase of a capital trial.”). 
221. Jon A. Krosnick & Richard E. Petty, Attitude Strength: An Overview, in ATTITUDE STRENGTH: 
ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 8 (R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick eds., 1995). 
222. EDELMAN, supra note 220, at 73–74. Professor Jamie L. Flexon posits that the additional factors 
of awareness, motivation, and external social control curb stereotypical thinking. Flexon, supra note 217, 
at 115. Not only are none of these common features of the modern capital trial, but studies have shown 
that the individuals most likely to inhibit their own stereotypical thinking are egalitarian, due-process-
oriented individuals who are less likely to be chosen to serve on a capital jury. Id. 
223. EDELMAN, supra note 220, at 74. 
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of a Black male juror reduces the likelihood of a death sentence.224 
Second, strong evidence may overcome stereotypical beliefs.225 During 
capital sentencing, jurors tend to rely most on stereotypes to choose a 
punishment when the evidence does not strongly favor either side; closer 
calls are more likely to render racist outcomes.226 A Philadelphia study 
found that, when the evidence of the defendant’s culpability is ambiguous, 
the victim’s race significantly impacts the likelihood that the jury will find 
the existence of a mitigating factor.227 Finally, the quality of the jury 
instructions affects how much jurors fall back on racist beliefs.228 
Complex jury instructions may cause jurors to rely more on stereotypical 
thinking to render a punishment decision.229 Studies have repeatedly 
demonstrated that racial and ethnic stereotypes have a prominent role 
when decisions require high information processing.230 Lynch and 
Haney’s 2009 study demonstrated that when participants exhibited lower 
comprehension of jury instructions they were more likely to sentence 
black defendants to death.231 The same is true when the instructions fail 
to provide the jury with adequate guidance.232 Because the jurors lack 
guidance on how to interpret mitigating evidence, they fall back on their 
unconscious stereotypical beliefs when imposing a capital sentence. The 
power to decide becomes the power to discriminate.233 
C. Disproportionately White Juries Limit the Impact of the 
Individualized Sentencing Requirement 
Two practices arising alongside the evolution of the individualized 
sentencing requirement have increased this likelihood: (1) the Supreme 
                                                   
224. Id. at 73–74. 
225. Id.  
226. Id. at 26, 32; Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination, supra note 182, at 1716; Lynch & Haney, 
Discrimination, supra note 211, at 340. 
227. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination, supra note 182, at 1714–16, 1720–21. 
228. EDELMAN, supra note 220, at 73–74. 
229. Lynch & Haney, Discrimination, supra note 211, at 340 (“[T]he influence of race in capital 
jury decision-making may be amplified by the complexities of the information-processing task faced 
by capital jurors.”). 
230. Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory: Testing 
Process Models of Stereotypic Use, 55 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 726, 726–37 (1988); Galen V. 
Bodenhausen & M. Lictenstein, Social Stereotypes and Information Processing Strategies: The 
Impact of Task Complexity, 52 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 871, 871–80 (1987); Galen V. Bodenhausen 
& Robert S. Wyer, Effects of Stereotypes on Decision-making and Information-processing Strategies, 
48 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 267, 267–82 (1985). 
231. Lynch & Haney, Discrimination, supra note 211, at 347. 
232. EDELMAN, supra note 220, at 74. 
233. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312 (“[T]he power to be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate . . . .”) 
(quoting K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1973)). 
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Court’s failure to prevent prosecutors’ use of racially discriminatory 
peremptory strikes; and (2) the ubiquity of death qualification of capital 
jurors. These practices work in tandem to create disproportionately White 
juries in capital cases. 
To begin with, evidences suggests that prosecutors continue to strike 
Black prospective jurors with impunity, despite the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Batson v. Kentucky,234 which sought to create a remedy for 
such behavior. The Batson decision set up a three-part test for trial judges 
to evaluate claims of racially discriminatory strikes.235 First, defense 
counsel must establish that the prosecutor’s pattern of strikes constitutes 
a prima facie case of racial discrimination.236 Having done so, the burden 
shifts to the prosecution to supply a race-neutral reason for the strike.237 
Finally, the court evaluates the prosecutor’s reason to determine if it is 
credible or a pretext for racial discrimination.238 
Over time, many scholars have observed that the problem with the 
Batson remedy is that it is toothless: it is simply too easy for the prosecutor 
to fabricate a race-neutral reason to defeat the defendant’s claim.239 Just a 
year after the Court decided Batson, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s 
Office produced a training video advising new prosecutors to ask more 
questions of Black jurors, “so it gives you more ammunition to make an 
articulable reason as to why you are striking them, not for race.”240 In its 
2010 report on racial discrimination in jury selection, the Equal Justice 
Initiative concluded that the racially discriminatory use of peremptory 
strikes “remains widespread, particularly in serious criminal cases and 
                                                   
234. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) 
235. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98. 
236. Id. at 98. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. See, e.g., Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records 
Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 403 (2016) (discussing criticism of Batson); Jeffrey Bellin 
& Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or 
Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1116 (2011) (discussing a trial judge’s 
reluctance to find a Batson violation that would harm the professional reputation of the offending attorney); 
Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Utter Failure to Meet the Challenge of 
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 501, 505 (1999) (“Any trial attorney with the 
wherewithal to refrain from using gender or race words in the explanation and the discipline to avoid 
accepting a juror to whom the exact same ‘neutral explanation’ would apply has beaten what one court 
calls the Batson ‘charade.’”). In his concurrence in Batson, Justice Marshall correctly predicted that the 
Batson test would be ineffective. 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
240. See Gilad Edelman, Why is it So Easy for Prosecutors to Strike Black Jurors?, NEW YORKER 
(June 5, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-is-it-so-easy-for-prosecutors-to-
strike-black-jurors [https://perma.cc/L2Z5-TDQC] (discussing video). A complete copy of the video 
is available online. See YouSchtupp, Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, YOUTUBE (Nov. 3, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPIZ6pe3ScQ (last visited May 2, 2020). 
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capital cases.”241 In Houston County, Alabama, prosecutors struck 80% 
of Black jurors in capital cases, while in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, 
prosecutors removed eligible Black jurors “at more than three times the 
rate that they strike [W]hite prospective jurors.”242 Studies in North and 
South Carolina have similar findings. Authors of the North Carolina study 
concluded, “[i]n the 114 cases decided on the merits by North Carolina 
appellate courts, the courts have never found a substantive Batson 
violation where a prosecutor has articulated a reason for the peremptory 
challenge of a minority juror.”243 In South Carolina, researchers 
determined that prosecutors struck eligible Black jurors at nearly three 
times the rate that they struck eligible White jurors.244 A reporter for The 
New Yorker recently summed up Batson’s legacy: “[t]he most remarkable 
thing about Batson, it turns out, is how easy it has been to ignore.”245 
More insidious than the direct removal of Black jurors is their indirect 
removal through the facially race-neutral practice of death qualification in 
capital trials. Death qualification refers to the process of removing 
potential jurors who indicate that their opposition to capital punishment 
would prevent them from imposing a death sentence under any 
circumstances.246 Although the Supreme Court had tacitly approved of 
this process in Witherspoon v. Illinois,247 a case that pre-dated Furman, it 
did so explicitly in 1985’s Wainwright v. Witt.248 In Wainwright, the Court 
held that a juror could be excused for cause when the juror’s beliefs would 
“prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
                                                   
241. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A 
CONTINUING LEGACY 5, 14 (2010), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-
discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KU7-H8L2]. 
242. Id. at 5, 14.  
243. Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina’s 
Remarkable Appellate Batson Record, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1957, 1957 (2016); see also Catherine M. 
Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury 
Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1554 (2012) 
(finding that Black prospective jurors in North Carolina are more than twice as likely as all other 
prospective jurors to be struck by prosecutors). 
244. Ann M. Eisenberg, Removal of Women and African-Americans in Jury Selection in South 
Carolina Capital Cases, 1997-2012, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 299, 299–300 (2017). 
245. See Edelman, supra note 240 (emphasis added). 
246. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 439 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining death 
qualification as “the exclusion for cause, in capital cases, of jurors opposed to capital punishment”). 
247. 391 U.S. 510, 522 & 522 n.21 (1968) (overturning a death sentence where the trial court 
permitted the prosecutor to exclude all jurors who indicated general objections to capital punishment, 
but indicating that State exclusion of jurors who stated they could not impose death would create a 
neutral jury). Although the Supreme Court has never indicated that the U.S. Constitution requires the 
death qualification of capital juries, Witherspoon legitimized the process, and it soon became the norm 
nationwide. Lynch & Haney, Death Qualification, supra note 207, at 3. 
248. 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). 
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accordance with his instructions and his oath.”249 The following year, in 
Lockhart v. McCree,250 the Court upheld the constitutionality of death 
qualification, despite social science evidence that indicated the process 
rendered a jury that was more conviction-prone.251 
Many scholars have noted that death qualification disproportionately 
removes African Americans from capital juries252 because African 
Americans are more likely to oppose the death penalty.253 Analyzing data 
from two recent surveys in Solano County—the county in California with 
the largest percentage of African-American residents—Lynch and Haney 
determined that significant differences existed between Whites and 
African Americans in both the amount and the strength of their support 
for capital punishment.254 Of the Solano jurors who would have been 
excluded during death qualification, between 80% and 90% of the African 
Americans opposed the death penalty, while Whites were equally likely 
to strongly support the death penalty as they were to oppose it.255 As a 
consequence, the African Americans who survived death qualification 
were a much smaller group than those originally in the venire and 
typically had views that made them outliers among their peers.256 
Lynch and Haney also concluded that Black and White prospective 
jurors assessed sentencing phase evidence differently: African Americans 
were much more likely to consider classic mitigation evidence—such as 
an impoverished childhood, familial substance abuse, mental illness, and 
a positive institutional history—as a thumb on the scale for mercy, while 
Whites often interpreted such evidence as supporting a death sentence.257 
Specifically, in the first Solano survey, 12–13% of White participants 
                                                   
249. Id. at 424 (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 
(1980). Importantly, as Professor Elisabeth Semel has made clear, the Court has never required death 
qualification in capital cases. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Oppose Death Qualification at 2–
3, People v. Leroy Johnson, No. F09904296 (Fresno Sup. Ct. July 11, 2017) [hereinafter Notice of 
Motion] (on file with author); Seminar, Elisabeth Semel, Dir. Berkeley Law Death Penalty Clinic, 
Plenary Session at the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice (CACJ) and California Public 
Defender Association (CPDA) Capital Case Defense Seminar: Selecting a Fair Jury: Witherspoon, 
Witt, and Batson (Feb. 2018). 
250. 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
251. See id. at 165, 168–171. 
252. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 244; Aliza P. Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s Lost 
Jurors: Death Qualification and Evolving Standards of Decency, 92 IND. L.J. 113, 118 (2016); J. 
Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic Dilemma in Death Qualification of Capital Jurors, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1107, 1140–43, 1147 (2014); Alec T. Swafford, Note, Qualified Support: Death 
Qualification, Equal Protection, and Race, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 147, 158 (2011). 
253. Lynch & Haney, Death Qualification, supra note 207, at 3–4. 
254. Id. at 11. 
255. Id. at 12. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 12–17. 
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stated that evidence indicating the defendant had a loving family who 
opposed his execution, had an impoverished childhood, had been raised 
by a single disabled parent, had himself been a good husband and parent, 
and had adjusted well to incarceration, would have made them more likely 
to impose a death sentence.258 Whites were especially unreceptive to 
evidence concerning a capital defendant’s social history or background, 
expressing the most enthusiasm for mitigation concerning the crime itself, 
such as lingering doubt and lack of premeditation.259 Lynch and Haney 
concluded that death qualification not only results in “the significant 
underrepresentation of African Americans . . . . but also leaves behind a 
subgroup that does not represent the views of its community.”260 
The interplay between death qualification and Batson results in the 
maximal exclusion of African Americans from the jury.261 Because death 
penalty views function as “proxies for race,”262 not only can prosecutors 
rely on death qualification to remove African Americans from the jury, 
they can also use the process as cover to survive a Batson challenge. 
Courts have deemed even mild opposition to or discomfort with the death 
penalty as a valid, non-racial reason to exercise a peremptory strike, and 
death qualification requires jurors to voice these opinions.263 Lynch and 
Haney have noted that jurors who survive death qualification “may 
nonetheless become prime targets to be dismissed through the use of 
peremptory challenges.”264 
The juries who sentence capital defendants are thus disproportionately 
White. White capital jurors are more skeptical that classic mitigation 
evidence supports a life sentence. The few African Americans chosen to 
serve on capital juries have views that make them outliers in their peer 
group. Thus, the jurors with the power to decide are those who are most 
likely to rely on explicit or implicit racial bias to impose sentence and/or 
those who are least representative of the community. These are the jurors 
who have unfettered discretion to evaluate mitigation evidence. Through 
its individualized sentencing jurisprudence, the Court has bestowed upon 
these jurors an Eighth Amendment power to discriminate. 
                                                   
258. Id. at 17. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 18. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 19. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
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III. KANSAS V. CARR: A NEW ATTACK ON THE 
INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING REQUIREMENT 
Does a judicial solution exist to this problem? The Court could decrease 
these negative outcomes and reinvigorate the individualized sentencing 
requirement in the process, simply by injecting context into its 
conversation. Thus far, the Court’s individualized sentencing requirement 
has centered on the amount of juror discretion, rather than the quality of 
that discretion: the liberal justices favor expansive juror discretion while 
the conservative justices champion the states’ rights to limit that 
discretion. As a result, the death penalty remains arbitrary and racist, and 
neither camp is happy. Instead, the Court should interpret the Eighth 
Amendment not only to forbid states from limiting a jury’s consideration 
of mitigating evidence, but also to permit states to require jurors to 
consider certain types of evidence as mitigation. Indeed, the Court’s 
decisions in Lockett, Eddings, Penry, Abdul-Kabir, and Brewer all support 
such an interpretation because all forbade states from precluding the 
consideration of the defendant’s relevant mitigation evidence.265 
However, there is reason to believe this solution may be out of reach. 
In this Part, I argue that Kansas v. Carr,266 the Court’s most recent 
decision involving the assessment of mitigation evidence, subtly altered 
the Court’s individualized sentencing jurisprudence by questioning both 
the efficacy and the legality of providing jurors with any guidance 
                                                   
265. See supra Part I.  
266. 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct 633 (2016). Justice Scalia’s opinion held only that the Eighth 
Amendment did not require such guidance, not that it forbade it. See id. at 642. However, Scalia went 
further and speculated that a state that chose to instruct the jury that mitigation need not be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt would be issuing an instruction that was, at best, confusing, and, at worst, 
logically impossible. Id. Scalia holds himself out as protecting the state of Kansas’s decision not to 
issue such an instruction, but, in reality, what he was protecting was the actions of an individual trial 
judge. As Justice Sotomayor notes, while the Kansas capital sentencing statute was silent on the 
matter, the Kansas Supreme Court had issued a directive to give the reasonable doubt instruction in 
2001. See id. at 650 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Kansas did not revise the pattern jury instructions to 
include that instruction until 2011, and the Carr brothers were tried in the interim. Id. The Pattern 
Instructions for Kansas, or PIK, are written by the Judicial Council, which is made up of the Chairs 
of the Kansas Senate and House Judiciary Committees and other individuals appointed by the Kansas 
Supreme Court. See State v. Gleason, 329 P.3d 1102, 1145 (Kan. 2014), rev’d and remanded sub 
nom. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016) (“Following this court’s ruling in Kleypas, the PIK committee 
amended the PIK instruction on mitigating circumstances to reflect Kleypas’ second statement 
regarding jury unanimity. But inexplicably, the committee did not amend the instruction to include 
the first statement—that mitigating circumstances need only be proven to the satisfaction of the 
individual juror and not beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Judicial Council Members, KANS. JUD. 
COUNS., https://www.kansasjudicialcouncil.org/about/judicial-council-members 
[https://perma.cc/TSZ5-RERW]. In her dissent, Sotomayor scolds the Court for granting certiorari for 
what amounts to “an intrastate dispute.” See Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 647 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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whatsoever.267 If Carr’s interpretation persists, it may render the 
individualized sentencing requirement meaningless. 
In 2016, Justice Scalia wrote what would be his final majority opinion 
in Carr.268 On the surface, the most noteworthy thing about Carr appeared 
to be its horrendous facts. Scalia’s majority opinion began with a detailed 
account of “the acts of almost inconceivable cruelty and depravity” for 
which the Carr brothers were convicted.269 What was known as “the 
Wichita Massacre” consisted of multiple acts of kidnapping, robbery, 
rape, attempted murder, and the murder of four people.270 Scalia famously 
interrupted oral argument to recount the chilling facts in detail.271 Both the 
result and the holding of the case are unsurprising for a Scalia capital 
punishment opinion. The Court overturned the judgment of the Kansas 
                                                   
267. At first glance, Carr may not appear to be a decision about the individualized sentencing 
requirement. Justice Scalia contended that the case was the intellectual heir to Buchanan v. Angelone, 
522 U.S. 269 (1998), and Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000). See Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 642. Both 
Buchanan and Weeks held that the Eighth Amendment does not require specific, affirmative 
instructions on mitigation. See Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276 (“[W]e have never . . . held that the state 
must affirmatively structure in a particular way the manner in which juries consider mitigating 
evidence.”); Weeks, 528 U.S. at 233. But in basing the Court’s opinion on Buchanan and Weeks, 
Scalia re-framed the respondent’s argument. Carr argued that the trial court’s ambiguous instructions 
failed to allow the jury to give effect to the entirety of the defense mitigation evidence. Final Brief for 
Respondent Reginald Dexter Carr, Jr. at 35–37, Carr, 136 S. Ct 633 (2016) (No. 14-450). Specifically, 
the trial court had instructed the jury that aggravation evidence had to be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but said nothing about the burden of proof with respect to mitigation evidence. Id. at 44. 
Because the aggravation instructions were juxtaposed with the mitigation instructions, the jury could 
have reasonably believed the burden applied to both types of evidence. Id. at 44–45. As the Kansas 
Supreme Court ruled, the instructions violated the individualized sentencing requirement because 
there was a reasonable likelihood that it prevented the jury from giving effect to any mitigation 
evidence that the jury believed had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gleason, 329 
P.3d at 1148 (“[J]urors may have been prevented from giving meaningful effect or a reasoned moral 
response to Gleason’s mitigating evidence, implicating Gleason’s right to individualized sentencing 
under the Eighth Amendment.”); State v. Carr, 331 P.3d 544, 732 (2014) (“When nothing in the 
instructions mentions any burden other than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ jurors may be ‘prevented 
from giving meaningful effect or a reasoned moral response to’ mitigating evidence, implicating a 
defendant’s right to individualized sentencing under the Eighth Amendment.”) (citing Gleason, 329 
P.3d at 1148). 
268. 136 S. Ct. at 633 (consolidating petitioner’s challenge to the Kansas State Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Gleason, 329 P.3d at 1102, which employed the same penalty phase instruction). Unlike 
Gleason, State v. Carr also held that the Eighth Amendment did not require severance of the brothers’ 
capital sentencing proceedings. Carr, 331 P.3d at 544. 
269. Id. at 638–39, 646. Notably, the Carr brothers are Black and their victims were White, 
presenting the racial scenario, which, as discussed in Part II, is most likely to result in a death 
sentence. See Dion Lefler, Kansas Supreme Court Hears Carr Brothers’ Death Penalty Appeals, 
WICHITA EAGLE (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:46 AM), https://www.kansas.com/news/special-reports/carr-
brothers/article1129860.html [https://perma.cc/Z66V-AG9E]; Ron Sylvester, Victims in 2000 
Quadruple Homicide Aren’t Forgotten, WICHITA EAGLE (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:49 AM), 
https://www.kansas.com/news/local/crime/article1049543.html [https://perma.cc/V3JW-668V].  
270. Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 638–39. 
271. Oral Argument at 31:28-33:11, Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 633, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-
449 [https://perma.cc/T3C3-8XCK].  
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Supreme Court and reinstated the brothers’ death sentences.272 The 
majority held that the Eighth Amendment did not require that states 
affirmatively instruct jurors that mitigation evidence need not be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.273 
What is noteworthy, however, is Justice Scalia’s explanation of the 
jury’s selection process in capital cases.274 Conceiving of the jury’s 
evaluation of mitigation as “a judgment call (or perhaps a value call)” and 
the ultimate sentencing decision as “mostly a question of mercy,” Scalia 
expresses doubt that it would even be possible to apply a burden of proof 
to this evaluation process.275 This reasoning is an about-face from  Justice 
Scalia who repeatedly championed states’ rights to rationalize mitigation 
assessment in his dissents in Penry I276 and Abdul-Kabir,277 as well as in 
his concurrences in Walton278 and Johnson.279 He once mocked Justice 
O’Connor’s notion of the “reasoned moral response” as lacking in reason 
and as just another way of saying “freakishly and wantonly.”280 But here, 
Scalia does O’Connor one better: he strips the selection decision of reason 
entirely. His assertion that the mitigation decision is too ephemeral for a 
specific burden of proof is particularly ironic given his Walton 
concurrence, which supports the plurality’s approval of Arizona’s 
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof for mitigation evidence.281 
What’s more, Justice Scalia had the option of reaching the same result 
by employing language that was consistent with his previous opinions. He 
has argued all along that the Eighth Amendment permits states to exact 
limitations on a jury’s consideration of mitigation evidence. He once 
lamented, “[t]here is little guidance in a system that requires each 
individual juror to bring to the ultimate decision his own idiosyncratic 
                                                   
272. Carr, 136 S. Ct at 646. 
273. Id. at 642–43. 
274. That Justice Scalia recognizes that the selection phase has unique characteristics is itself 
remarkable. Scalia formerly deemed the differing constitutional requirements ascribed to the 
eligibility phase and the selection phase as “an arbitrary line.” Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 
279 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
275. Carr, 136 S. Ct at 642. 
276. See Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 353–58 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
277. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 280–84 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
278. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656–74 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
279. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 373–74 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
280. See Penry I, 492 U.S. at 359–60 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
281. Walton, 497 U.S. at 650 (“We . . . decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative a rule that 
would require the court to consider the mitigating circumstances claimed by a defendant unless the 
State negated them by a preponderance of the evidence.”); id. at 657 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I agree 
with the Court’s analysis of petitioner’s first claim, and concur in its opinion as to Parts I, II, and V.”). 
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notion of what facts are mitigating . . . .”282 Scalia needed only to have 
framed the Carr opinion as a permissible state limitation, in the spirit of 
Walton or Buchanan, for instance, one that does not preclude the 
sentencer from considering mitigation evidence.283 
What accounts for Justice Scalia’s about face on the selection process? 
It is almost certainly not stare decisis. Scalia made clear in his Walton 
concurrence that he would not be guided by stare decisis with respect to 
the Court’s jurisprudence on the individualized sentencing process: “I 
cannot adhere to a principle so lacking in support in constitutional text 
and so plainly unworthy of respect under stare decisis.”284 Perhaps such 
language was required to gain the support of the liberal justices? This also 
seems unlikely. Seven justices signed on to Scalia’s majority opinion, 
with only Justice Sotomayor dissenting.285 It seems likely Scalia could 
have gained the support from four of these justices—Roberts, Kennedy,286 
Alito, and Thomas, all of whom had voted with Scalia in the past on this 
issue287—without the added language describing sentencing selection as a 
moral value judgment. 
After years of attempting to kill the unfettered discretion ascribed to 
the individualized sentencing requirement—first by pointing out its 
contradictions, then by refusing to apply it288—Justice Scalia embraced it 
                                                   
282. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 469 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Until today, I 
would have thought that North Carolina’s scheme was a model of guided discretion.”). 
283. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 656 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 
276 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he state may shape and structure the jury’s consideration of 
mitigation so long as it does not preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating evidence.”). 
284. Walton, 497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
285. Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 633, 636 (2016). Justice Sotomayor’s dissent indicated 
not that she disagreed with the substance of the Court’s holding, but that she did not believe the Court 
should have granted certiorari in the case:  
I do not believe these cases should ever have been reviewed by the Supreme Court. I see no 
reason to intervene in cases like these—and plenty of reasons not to. Kansas has not violated any 
federal constitutional right. If anything, the State has overprotected its citizens based on its 
interpretation of state and federal law. Id. at 646. 
286. It is possible that Justice Scalia was seeking the support of Justice Kennedy who had not 
always sided with Scalia in cases involving the individualized sentencing requirement. While 
Kennedy, like Scalia, dissented in Penry I, the two justices were on opposite sides in Penry II, Smith, 
Abdul-Kabir, and Brewer. That said, both Kennedy and Scalia were in the majority in Buchanan and 
Weeks, the two cases Scalia relied on to hold that the constitution does not require any particular 
affirmative instructions on mitigation. Id. at 642. Accordingly, it is improbable that Scalia’s 
explanation of the selection decision as a moral choice was a concession to Justice Kennedy.  
287. See, for example, Justices Scalia and Thomas joining in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
in Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005); Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas joining in Justice 
Roberts’ dissents in Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 265–80 (Roberts, J., dissenting) and Brewer, 127 S. Ct. 
at 1714–23 (Roberts, J., dissenting); and Justices Alito and Thomas joining in Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 281–85 (Roberts, J., dissenting) and Brewer, 127 S. Ct. at 1723–25 (2007) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
288. For an example of the former, see Penry I, 492 U.S. at 359–60 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Court cannot seriously believe that rationality and predictability can be achieved, and capriciousness 
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fully in Carr. According to Scalia’s opinion, states cannot guide jurors’ 
consideration of mitigation evidence because this decision is too much of 
a “judgment call.”289 In doing so, Scalia embraced a state limitation on 
juror discretion that encouraged consideration of the defendant’s 
mitigation evidence; that is, any evidence the defendant had presented that 
he was unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In so holding, Justice Scalia reinstated three death sentences and 
watered down the individualized sentencing requirement in the process—
all with the support of seven other justices.290 Only Justice Sotomayor 
appeared to grasp the significance of the move: “[t]he Eighth Amendment 
has nothing to say about whether such an instruction is wise as a question 
of state law or policy. But the majority nonetheless uses this Court’s 
considerable influence to call into question the logic of specifying any 
burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances.”291 Justice Sotomayor 
pointed out that not only was such a finding unnecessary, it was 
disingenuous given that “many States . . . do specify a burden of proof for 
the existence of mitigating factors as a matter of state law, presumably 
under the belief that it is, in fact, ‘possible’ to do so.’”292 Sotomayor 
indicated that the horrible facts of the case provided cover for the 
overreach of the majority opinion: “[t]he standard adage teaches that hard 
cases make bad law. I fear that these cases suggest a corollary: Shocking 
cases make too much law.”293 
The Court had once before employed the individualized sentencing 
requirement in this way, in Buchanan v. Angelone.294 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the decision, which upheld a Virginia death sentence 
where the trial judge did not instruct jurors on mitigation evidence 
                                                   
avoided, by ‘narrow[ing] a sentencer’s discretion to impose the death sentence,’ but expanding his 
discretion ‘to decline to impose the death sentence[.]’” (quoting McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 304)). For 
an example of the latter, see Walton, 497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I cannot adhere to a 
principle so lacking in support in constitutional text and so plainly unworthy of respect under stare 
decisis. Accordingly, I will not, in this case or in the future, vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment 
claim that the sentencer’s discretion has been unlawfully restricted.”).  
289. Walton, 497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
290. See id. at 636. 
291. See id. at 648 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  
292. Id. at 648 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citing Brief for Respondent 
Sidney J. Gleason at 28–29, n.6, Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016) (No. 14-452), 
2015 WL 4624623 at *28–29, 28 n.6). Justice Sotomayor also notes that at least two states employ a 
jury instruction that mitigation need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 648–49 (citing 
Idaho Crim. Jury Instructions 1718 (2010); Okla. Uniform Jury Instructions-Crim., 4-78 (2015)). 
293. Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 651 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
294. See 522 U.S. 269, 270 (1998). Chief Justice Rehnquist also wrote Weeks v. Angelone, 528 
U.S. 225 (2000), which upheld a death sentence where the jury received the same instructions 
approved of in Buchanan and where the trial court reiterated these instructions in response to a jury 
note. Id. at 227, 231. 
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generally or on specific mitigating factors requested by the defense.295 
Rehnquist, like Justice Scalia, opposed the individualized sentencing 
requirement’s unfettered discretion because he believed it “codif[ied] and 
institutionalize[d]” arbitrariness.296 He dissented in Woodson and Lockett 
and routinely joined the dissenting justices in the subsequent cases that 
expanded the individualized sentencing requirement.297 In Buchanan, 
however, Rehnquist sang a different tune, finding that states were not 
required to give affirmative mitigation instructions and explaining that 
“our decisions suggest that complete jury discretion is 
constitutionally  permissible.”298 
Perhaps inspired by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s move of using liberal 
language to support a conservative decision, Justice Scalia chiefly relied 
on Buchanan in Carr.299 By signaling his conversion on the view that the 
selection process is a moral judgment, Scalia gained the support of the 
liberal justices and thus their complicity in watering down the demands of 
the individualized sentencing requirement. The takeaway from Carr is 
that, while individualized sentencing may forbid states from employing 
jury instructions that preclude the sentencer from giving effect to 
mitigation evidence, it does not mandate that states affirmatively instruct 
jurors on the extent of their ability to do so; thus, a jury that is confused 
or uninformed about state law is constitutionally permissible—at least 
under the Eighth Amendment. The greater danger of Carr is, of course, 
that by characterizing the selection process as purely moral, the Court 
signals a willingness to endorse a regime that opposes state efforts to 
guide jurors’ discretion—even for the purpose of maximizing the 
mitigation they consider. In such a regime, with no guidance, 
disproportionately White juries are even more likely to rely on 
unconscious racism to determine punishment.300 
Justice Scalia died suddenly three weeks after the Court issued the Carr 
opinion. With his death, the question becomes: will Scalia’s rhetorical 
maneuver die with him, or does Carr have legs? While the Court has yet 
                                                   
295. See Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 270, 278 
296. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 631 (1978) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
297. Id. at 628–33; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308–24 (1976) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). See also, e.g., Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.); Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 350 
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Kennedy, J.); Mills v. 
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 390 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 
86 (1987) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 120 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by White, J., Blackmun, J., and Rehnquist, J.). 
298. Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added). 
299. Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 633, 642 (2016). 
300. See EDELMAN, supra note 220, at 74; Lynch & Haney, Discrimination, supra note 211, at 347. 
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to revisit the individualized sentencing requirement, there is reason to 
believe that the current justices may be open to gutting the requirement 
through expansion. From his earlier opinions, the Justice most likely to 
push back on Scalia’s re-characterization of the selection process, 
ironically, was Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas repeatedly echoed Justice 
Scalia’s concerns about the requirement, arguing that unlimited discretion 
to consider mitigation would result in an arbitrary and racist death 
penalty.301 Thomas even once warned the Court to “beware the word 
moral” which could serve as a cloak for racist decision-making.302 Despite 
his previous reservations, Justice Thomas also joined the majority opinion 
in Carr.303 While the views of Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh 
are not fully known, there is reason to believe that neither man would 
create a barrier. To date, Justice Gorsuch has voted to affirm the 
convictions and sentences in nearly every capital case.304 Moreover, his 
opinion in Bucklew v. Precythe,305 jettisoned standard Eighth Amendment 
analysis, which evaluates cruel and unusual punishments based on 
evolving standards of decency, in favor of a Thomas-like approach, which 
focused on public understanding of capital punishment at the time of the 
                                                   
301. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 494–95 (1993) (Thomas, J. concurring). 
302. See id. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
303. Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 636. 
304. As of January 2020, the only case in which Justice Gorsuch had sided with a capital defendant 
was Ayestas v. Davis, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1080 (2018), a narrow procedural decision in which the 
Court unanimously held that the Fifth Circuit applied the wrong standard when they denied Carlos 
Ayestas’s funding request for investigative services. Id. at 1085. In Gorsuch’s first term, 2017–2018, 
he voted against capital defendants in: McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1512 (2018) 
(joining Justice Alito’s dissent); Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1197 (2018) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (voting against Court’s ruling to reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation 
of federal habeas reviewing procedure); Tharpe v. Sellers, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 545, 547 (2018) 
(joining Justice Thomas’s dissent from the per curiam decision); Dunn v. Madison, 583 U.S. __, 138 
S. Ct. 9 (2017) (per curiam). Justice Gorsuch also voted to deny the stay applications in each of the 
cases where the Court granted a stay of execution: Bucklew v. Precythe, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1323 
(2018); Madison v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 943 (2018); Tharpe v. Sellers, __ U.S .__, 138 
S. Ct. 53 (2017). During the 2018–2019 term, Justice Gorsuch again sided against the capital 
defendant in the five cases argued before the court: Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 
2228, 2252 (2019) (joining Justice Thomas’s dissent in part); Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. __, 139 
S. Ct. 1112 (2019); Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2019) (joining Justice 
Alito’s dissent); Moore v. Texas, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 666, 673 (2019) (joining Justice Alito’s 
dissent from the per curiam decision); Shoop v. Hill, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 504 (2019) (per curiam). 
He also voted to deny Patrick Murphy’s application for a stay of execution, which the Court granted 
in Murphy v. Collier, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (2019), and joined Justice Alito in dissenting from 
a grant, vacate, and remand order in White v. Kentucky, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019). 
305. 587 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).  
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Founding.306 While Justice Kavanaugh’s rulings exhibit more nuance,307 
he has publicly praised Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death penalty 
jurisprudence.308 Thus, only Justice Sotomayor, the lone dissenter in Carr, 
is likely to push back. 
IV. RETHINKING THE INDIVIDUALIZED 
SENTENCING  REQUIREMENT 
To have an individualized sentencing requirement with no boundaries 
is to have no individualized sentencing requirement at all because it fails 
to protect capital defendants from the race-based decision-making of 
disproportionately White juries. What, if anything, may be done to 
reinvigorate the requirement? In this Part, I explore possible judicial 
solutions to this problem, before arguing that states should implement jury 
instructions that limit juror discretion by requiring them to consider 
                                                   
306. See id. at 1123–24; id. at 1144 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that the 
Eighth Amendment is not a static prohibition that proscribes the same things that it proscribed in the 
18th century. Rather, it forbids punishments that would be considered cruel and unusual today.”).  
307. See, e.g., Collier, 139 S. Ct. at 1475–76 (concurring in grant of stay of execution of condemned 
man for whom Texas denied the presence of a Buddhist cleric in the execution chamber, but indicating 
that the execution could go forward if Texas were to ban all spiritual advisors from the execution 
chamber). Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion granting relief to capital defendant Curtis 
Flowers but made clear his ruling was limited to that unique situation: “[i]n reaching that conclusion, 
we break no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce Batson by applying it to the 
extraordinary facts of this case.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235. 
308. See American Enterprise Institute, Remarks by Brett M. Kavanaugh at the 2017 Walter Berns 
Constitution Day Lecture (Sept. 18, 2017), in FROM THE BENCH: THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATESMANSHIP OF 
CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST 9 (2017), http://lc.org/PDFs/Attachments2PRsLAs/2018/07101 
8KavanaughSpeech2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MU4-4WTC] (stating that Rehnquist’s dissent in Furman 
“packed a punch”). Justice Kavanaugh further stated: 
A mere five and a half pages in the US reports deftly summarize the fundamental problems 
[Rehnquist] saw in the core of the Court’s holding. As he explained, the decision “brings into 
sharp relief the fundamental question of the role of judicial review in a democratic society.” He 
continued, “The most expansive reading of the leading constitutional cases does not remotely 
suggest that this Court has been granted a roving commission, either by the Founding Fathers or 
by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, to strike down laws that are based upon notions 
of policy or morality suddenly found unacceptable by a majority of this Court.” The Court’s 
ruling, Rehnquist stated, was “not an act of judgment, but rather an act of will.” 
 
But the story did not end there. In the wake of Furman, many states enacted new capital 
punishment statutes. In 1976, the Court turned around and upheld many of them. To this day, 
the death penalty remains constitutional. Many judges and justices no doubt have policy or moral 
concerns about the death penalty. But Rehnquist’s call for the Court to remember its proper and 
limited role in the constitutional scheme has so far proved enduring in the death penalty context. 
 
In short, today’s constitutional jurisprudence in the field of criminal procedure and the death 
penalty has Rehnquist’s fingerprints all over it. Those are the cases that Rehnquist cared about 
most. That was his mission primarily, and it is fair to say that he had a dramatic and enduring 
effect on the course of constitutional law in those areas. Id. at 11–12 (endnotes omitted) (quoting 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 466–68 (1972)). 
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certain types of evidence as inherently supportive of a life sentence. I 
argue that states should issue these instructions alongside a “race salient 
debunking instruction,” designed to curb racist decision-making. Finally, 
I contend that states may realize the intended outcomes of the 
individualized sentencing requirement by maintaining expansive juror 
discretion only for the purpose of imposing mercy. I propose that a mercy 
instruction will achieve the goal of minimizing “false-positive” 
death  sentences. 
A. Shifting to State Solutions 
As Kansas v. Carr reveals, the Supreme Court is unlikely to require 
specific mitigation guidelines in the future, having held that the 
Constitution does not require states to issue affirmative instructions on 
mitigation. If anything, Carr suggests that the Court might be moving 
toward a model of favoring even greater discretion for the jurors making 
this “moral judgment call.”309 Another approach is to challenge the two 
practices that ensure the failure of the individualized sentencing 
requirement to reduce the arbitrariness and racism of the capital 
punishment: (1) death qualification of capital juries; and (2) prosecutors’ 
use of racially discriminatory strikes. Here, state trial courts appear to be 
a better venue for these challenges than the current U.S. Supreme Court. 
Although Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Glossip v. 
Gross310 signaled that the Court might be willing to re-assess the 
constitutionality of death qualification, this no longer seems likely given 
the current makeup of the Court.311 Scholars and advocates have 
undertaken the short-term strategy of arguing that trial judges may use 
their discretion to decline to death qualify capital jurors, along with the 
long-term strategy of creating records in state trial courts that include 
modern social science data on the harms of death qualification.312 
Similarly, the Court has little motivation to re-think its Batson 
                                                   
309. See supra Part III. 
310. 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
311. Id. at 2758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Susan D. 
Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 772–93, 807 (2006)) (“[F]or over fifty years, empirical investigation has 
demonstrated that death qualification skews juries toward guilt and death.”). Despite the current 
makeup of the United States Supreme Court, advocates continue to challenge death qualification in 
state courts. See Notice of Motion, supra note 249, at 2–3; Semel, supra note 249.  
312. See Notice of Motion, supra note 249, at 2–3; see also Lynch & Haney, Death Qualification, 
supra note 207, at 2 (discussing data from a county survey that served as the basis for a challenge to 
death qualification in state court). See generally Semel, supra note 249. Professor Aliza Plener-Cover 
has argued that the Court should adjust its Eighth Amendment assessment of the evolving standards 
of decency to consider the impact death qualification has had on jury composition. Cover, supra note 
244, at 115. 
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jurisprudence—particularly having recently decided Flowers v. 
Mississippi313 and Foster v. Chatman314 in favor of the capital defendant. 
Because of this reality, scholars and advocates continue to propose new 
ways to curb racially discriminatory strikes in trial courts.315 
Consequently, the best solutions for reinvigorating the individualized 
sentencing requirement will likely have to come from state legislatures.316 
While the Court will not compel states to act, it is also unlikely to interfere 
with those that do choose to develop instructions to guide juror discretion 
for the consideration of mitigation evidence, provided the instructions 
come from state legislatures or state jury instruction committees, and not 
from state courts interpreting the U.S. Constitution.317 To date, the only 
formal limitation on state-required penalty-phase instructions is that they 
not preclude the consideration of mitigation evidence.318 
One might think that the simplest solution would be for states to mimic 
the ways in which they guide juror discretion with respect to aggravating 
circumstances. States typically enumerate individual aggravators in their 
capital sentencing statutes.319 The trial judge then instructs the jury that it 
                                                   
313. Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019) (holding, in a case where 
the same prosecutor had tried the capital defendant six times for the same crime, that the trial court 
could consider findings that the prosecutor had discriminated against Black jurors in the previous 
trials in evaluating whether he did so in the sixth trial). 
314. 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 (2016) (holding the prosecutor had discriminatory intent 
when he struck multiple Black perspective jurors, as evidenced by “shifting explanations, the 
misrepresentations of the record, and the persistent focus on race in the prosecution’s file”). 
315. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 239, at 415–18 (proposing that defense attorneys attack 
peremptory strikes based on the purportedly race-neutral factor of prior arrest history as thinly veiled 
race-based strikes). 
316. While it is debatable whether state legislatures possess the political will to change their capital 
sentencing statutes, presumably even the staunchest death penalty proponents prefer a capital 
punishment system that minimizes unfair, arbitrary, and racially discriminatory outcomes. 
317. The issue in Carr was whether the Eighth Amendment required a specific burden of proof 
instruction for mitigation evidence, not whether the Kansas Constitution or capital sentencing scheme 
required the instruction. Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct 633, 641–43 (2016). The Court 
reversed the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution. Id. 
318. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998) (“Our consistent concern has been that 
restrictions on the jury’s sentencing determination not preclude the jury from being able to give effect 
to mitigating evidence.”). 
319. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(1)–(20) (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(F)(1)–(10) 
(2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(1)–(10) (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1)–(22) 
(2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(a)–(q) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(a)–(p) (2019); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(1)–(12) (2018); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(9)(a)–(k) (2019); IND. CODE 
§ 35-50-2-9(b)(1)–(16) (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5401(a)(1)–(7) (2018); KY. REV. STAT. 
§ 532.025(2)(a)(1)–(8) (2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(A)(1)–(10) (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-3-19(2)(a)–(h) (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032.2(1)–(17) (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
18-303(1)–(4) (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(a)–(i) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(1)–
(15) (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1(I)(a)–(g) (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(1)–
(11) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2903.01(A)–(G), 2929.02(A), 2929.04(a)(1)–(10) (2019); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(1)–(8) (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095(1)–(2) (2019); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)–(12) (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(1)–(10) (2019); TENN. 
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may consider only the applicable aggravators when assessing the 
defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty or when selecting the 
appropriate punishment.320 But, the reality is most states already have 
specifically enumerated statutory mitigators.321 These states also typically 
instruct jurors that they may consider these statutory mitigators in addition 
to “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.”322 Studies show that these instructions are 
ineffective because, when presented with an enumerated list, jurors 
typically limit their consideration to the factors on the list.323 
B. Guiding Sentencer Discretion 
If enumeration is inadequate, what kinds of jury instructions are most 
effective at guiding juror discretion, particularly on the mitigation 
question? I propose that jurors be instructed not only on what they may 
consider, but also on how to consider it. Instructions should not merely 
list possible mitigating factors to consider; instead, they should explain 
that jurors must consider these factors as evidence weighing in favor of a 
life sentence—for instance, that these factors are mitigating as a matter of 
law. Support for this idea can be gleaned from the Supreme Court itself. 
                                                   
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(1)–(18) (2019); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1)–(10) (West 2019); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)–(2) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (West 2020); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(i)–(xii) (West 2020). 
320. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1), (2) (West 2020) (explaining the role of 
aggravating factors in capital sentencing determination). That section in the Ohio code frames the 
jury instructions. See OHIO CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 503.011(1), (8), (9) (2020) (instructing jurors how 
to consider aggravating factors in capital sentencing decision).  
321. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (listing statutory mitigators); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
701E (2019) (same); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605 (2018) (same); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 190.3 
(West 2020) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4) (2018) (same); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(7) 
(2019) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c) (same). 
322. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). For example, California instructs jurors that they 
may consider “[a]ny other circumstance, whether related to these charges or not, that lessens the 
gravity of the crime[s] even though the circumstance is not a legal excuse or justification. These 
circumstances include sympathy or compassion for the defendant or anything you consider to be a 
mitigating factor, regardless of whether it is one of the factors listed above.” JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF 
CAL. CRIMINAL JURY INSTR. 763 (2017) [hereinafter CAL. CRIMINAL JURY INSTR. 763], 
https://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/calcrim/500/763/ [https://perma.cc/P256-93Q2]. 
323. See, e.g., Marc W. Patry & Steven D. Penrod, Death Penalty Decisions: Instruction 
Comprehension, Attitudes, and Decision Mediators, 13 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRACT. 204, 215 
(2013) (finding that “providing jurors with a List of case-specific mitigators does not necessarily cue 
jurors in to mitigating factors present in the case at hand”); id. at 222 (finding that the presence of a 
list of case-specific mitigators did not interact with non-listed mitigator of emotional abuse to 
influence juror sentencing decisions); see also Joshua N. Sondheimer, A Continuing Source of 
Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 409, 432 (1990) (“Merely listing the circumstances to be considered has not provided 
enough guidance to sentencing authorities.”). 
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In Penry I, Justice O’Connor found that some factors are inherently 
mitigating, due to shared societal values.324 O’Connor wrote: 
[E]vidence about the defendant’s background and character is 
relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that 
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a 
disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, 
may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.325 
Taken to the next logical step, an instruction would guide jurors that 
such evidence is mitigating and that jurors must consider it as evidence 
supporting a punishment of life imprisonment. 
What evidence should constitute mitigation as a matter of law? Some 
examples are obvious. Taking a cue from Justice O’Connor, evidence of 
a disadvantaged background or a defendant’s emotional or mental 
problems would constitute mitigation as a matter of law.326 Evidence that 
falls just short of rendering a defendant ineligible for the death penalty, 
such as the defendant’s youth327 or cognitive limitations,328 would also 
merit a legal mitigation instruction. Current state statutory mitigators 
would qualify because their codification indicates their endorsement by 
state legislatures as legally mitigating. 
Some types of evidence are ambiguous. Take, for example, evidence 
that a defendant has a substance abuse history. Courts often refer this type 
of evidence as a “double-edged sword” because, while the defense 
contends it is evidence of a disadvantaged background and/or a need to 
self-medicate mental health issues, the State will counter that it is the 
result of the defendant’s bad choices.329 Several solutions exist for this 
type of evidence. First, the legislature can decide to make such evidence 
statutorily mitigating, rendering it mitigation as a matter of law. Second, 
the court could decide if the evidence is legally mitigating prior to the 
penalty phase, after hearing arguments from both sides. A third, least good 
                                                   
324. Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989). Justice O’Connor first proposed this 
idea in her concurrence in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
325. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 319 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting California, 479 U.S. at 545) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
326. See id. 
327. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding individuals who are under eighteen at 
the time of their crime are ineligible for the death penalty). 
328. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding individuals who are intellectually 
disabled are ineligible for the death penalty). 
329. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 9 So. 3d 539, 557 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (finding that defense 
counsel’s conclusion that defendant’s alcohol and drug use was “a double-edged sword” was 
reasonable); People v. Ward, 718 N.E.2d 117, 126–27 (Ill. 1999) (“With respect to the evidence of 
defendant’s alcohol and drug abuse, we initially note that we have recognized that evidence of a 
history of substance abuse is a double-edged sword because this evidence can be viewed as either 
aggravating or mitigating.”); Smith v. State, 245 P.3d 1233, 1243 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010) (citing 
cases from the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits that deem evidence of substance abuse a 
“double-edged” or “two-edged” sword).  
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option is that the jury could retain its discretion to evaluate this evidence 
in the manner it sees fit. This option is the least desirable because, as 
discussed previously, the wide discretion will allow racism and 
arbitrariness to creep into sentencing decisions, albeit on a somewhat 
smaller scale than under current conditions. That said, even in a system 
where jurors are instructed that some evidence constitutes mitigation as a 
matter of law, the court would likely also need to give an additional 
“catch-all” instruction—that jurors may also consider any aspect of a 
defendant’s background or character or the circumstances of the crime as 
mitigation evidence—or risk violating the Court’s mandate in Lockett, 
Eddings, and Penry I. 
To successfully guide discretion, jury instructions must exhibit several 
additional characteristics. The best instructions are simple, involving 
plain, non-legal language. There is substantial evidence that jurors 
consistently misunderstand jury instructions.330 Most jurors are unfamiliar 
with the terms “aggravation” and “mitigation,” and do not find that current 
instructions adequately define them.331 Studies involving simulated 
capital sentencing phases have found that jurors demonstrate greater 
comprehension when provided with simplified instructions than they do 
with a state’s model jury instructions.332 When jury instructions are too 
complex, jurors are likely to misunderstand them and fall back on their 
own personal beliefs, including racial bias.333 
                                                   
330. Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt Is Overwhelming, 
Aggravation Requires Death, and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1042, 1058 
n.176, 1072–73, 1076 (2001) (“Even when jurors do report a discussion of mitigating factors, their 
understanding of what the law defines as mitigation is extremely limited. In the relatively rare instance 
when mitigating evidence is mentioned, jurors either seem not to understand what they are to do with 
such evidence or they dismiss it out of hand as no excuse for the murder.”); James Frank & Brandon 
K. Applegate, Assessing Juror Understanding of Capital-Sentencing Instructions, 44 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 412, 419–23 (1998); Richard L. Wiener et. al., Guided Jury Discretion in Capital 
Murder Cases: The Role of Declarative and Procedural Knowledge, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
516, 529–30 (2004). 
331. See Lynch & Haney, Discrimination, supra note 211, at 339, 347 (“[S]izable numbers of 
participants were confused enough about the process to use aggravating evidence to support life 
verdicts and mitigating evidence to support death.”).  
332. See, e.g., Wiener et al., supra note 330, at 539, 555, 564 (discussing results of Missouri studies 
that showed that instructions which “used simple language and relied on abstract legal terms only 
when those terms were indispensable to the meaning of the instructions” outperformed the state’s 
model instructions in terms of juror comprehension). 
333. See Lynch & Haney, Discrimination, supra note 211, at 340 (“[T]he influence of race in 
capital jury decision-making may be amplified by the complexities of the information-processing task 
faced by capital jurors.”); Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors 
Use the Law, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 508–11 (1993) (indicating studies have shown that jurors 
often rely on prior knowledge of legal concepts derived from popular media when presented with 
contrary jury instructions); Wiener et al., supra note 330, at 532 (indicating prior studies demonstrate 
that “people rely heavily on their own general knowledge of social reality, that is, their stored 
declarative knowledge about the law when they process trial-like information”). 
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Several interpretation errors are common. First, as discussed above, 
some jurors, particularly White jurors, interpret evidence intended to be 
mitigating as aggravating.334 Second, although many states have a 
statutory presumption in favor of life without parole,335 jurors frequently 
misunderstand this, and err on the side of selecting death.336 Many believe 
that the mere existence of an aggravating factor requires a death 
sentence.337 These effects skew capital juries toward death.338 Using the 
death-worthiness framework, this results in more false positives,339 i.e., 
the execution of those who did not deserve the death penalty—something 
proponents of the individualized sentencing requirement sought to 
minimize. 
                                                   
334. See, e.g., Lynch & Haney, Death Qualification, supra note 207, at 165 (discussing tendency 
of White juror-eligible survey respondents to “inappropriately use mitigating evidence in support of 
a death sentence”).  
335. States that permit a death sentence only when the jury finds the aggravating factors outweigh 
the mitigating factors have a presumption of life without parole because that is the appropriate 
punishment if the factors are in equipoise. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (2019) (“(2) If the jury 
determines that one or more aggravating circumstances as defined in Section 13A-5-49 exist but do 
not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, it shall return a verdict of life imprisonment without 
parole; (3) If the jury determines that one or more aggravating circumstances as defined in 
Section 13A-5-49 exist and that they outweigh the mitigating circumstances, if any, it shall return a 
verdict of death.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a) (West 2020) (“The jury shall impose a sentence of 
death if the jury unanimously returns written findings that: (1) An aggravating circumstance exists 
beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) Aggravating circumstances outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all 
mitigating circumstances found to exist; and (3) Aggravating circumstances justify a sentence of death 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 2020) (“If the trial jury 
unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the 
offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jury shall 
recommend to the court that the sentence of death be imposed on the offender. Absent such a finding, 
the jury shall recommend that the offender be sentenced to [a lesser sentence].”); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-13-204(f)(2) (West 2020) (“If the jury unanimously determines that a statutory aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such 
circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating 
circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall, in its considered discretion, 
sentence the defendant either to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or to imprisonment 
for life.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(5)(b) (West 2020) (“The death penalty shall only be imposed 
if, after considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the jury is persuaded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and is further persuaded, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in 
the  circumstances.”). 
336. Lynch & Haney, Discrimination, supra note 211, at 339. 
337. Bentele & Bowers, supra note 330, at 1013 (finding that “jurors erroneously assume that 
aggravating factors require a death sentence to be imposed”). 
338. Lynch & Haney, Discrimination, supra note 211, at 339, 347 (“Instructional confusion created 
a bias in favor of death verdicts that was more focused and circumscribed than we had expected.”).  
339. See Garvey, supra note 103, at 993, 1004–07. 
 
11 Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:48 PM 
2020] THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT POWER TO DISCRIMINATE 863 
 
Jury instructions that directly address and “debunk” jurors’ mistaken 
beliefs are more effective.340 Studies have shown that simple language 
alone does “not completely de-bias” jurors’ decision-making.341 A 2009 
study confirmed that “[t]o be successful, pattern instructions . . . need to 
replace an incorrect knowledge structure with one that contains content 
directly contradicting the juror’s initial, and incorrect, understanding.”342 
As an example, a successful mitigation as a matter of law instruction 
would not only tell jurors that they must consider particular evidence as 
mitigating, but it would also tell jurors that they could not consider the 
evidence as aggravating. Employing these principles, I propose the 
following instruction: 
You have heard evidence that [insert specific mitigating 
circumstance].343 If you believe this evidence, you must consider 
it as evidence that supports a sentence of life without parole. You 
may not consider this evidence in support of a death sentence. 
To curb racially discriminatory decision-making, successful jury 
instructions should also be “race salient.”344 Researchers Samuel 
Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth first coined “race salience” in their 
groundbreaking research that demonstrated that the inclusion of explicit 
racial bias in the facts of a crime, such as racial slurs or hate speech, 
reduced the impact of implicit bias in a simulated jury setting.345 Sommers 
and Ellsworth concluded that when race was made salient in this way, 
White jurors treated Black and White defendants equally; conversely, 
when race was merely a silent background issue, White jurors were more 
likely to treat White defendants better than Black defendants.346 As 
                                                   
340. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 330, at 542, 555, 564–65, 570 (“Our current data show that a 
debunking instruction designed to correct common errors may improve jury understanding of, at least, 
the concepts that make up the law.”). 
341. Id. at 532. 
342. Id. at 535; see also id. at 570 (“[J]urors bring to the sentencing process errors in understanding 
some of the basic elements of law (i.e., the nature of aggravation and mitigation). Unless the 
instructions correct these errors, there is a great likelihood that jurors will make these same errors 
when they deliberate and assign a sentence.”). 
343. Among others, some examples might include “that the defendant suffered from physical abuse as 
a child”; “that the defendant suffered repeated head injuries”; “that the defendant exhibits symptoms of 
schizophrenia”; or “that the defendant has been addicted to methamphetamine since age fourteen.” 
344. Ellen S. Cohn, et al., Reducing White Juror Bias: The Role of Race Salience and Racial 
Attitudes, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1953 (2009) (concluding that race salience also reduces 
impact of overtly racist jurors). 
345. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and 
Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367 (2000) [hereinafter 
Sommers, Race in the Courtroom]. 
346. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and 
Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1014–16 (2003) 
[hereinafter Sommers, How Much]; Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in 
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explanation, Sommers and Ellsworth concluded that explicit 
discriminatory language reminded White jurors of their egalitarian values. 
These jurors typically both were “loath to appear prejudiced” and often 
“genuinely desire[d] to avoid bias.”347 Building on this research, others 
have contended that jury instructions employing race salience may have a 
similar impact.348 Racially salient instructions would function as 
debunking instructions, first advising jurors of the pitfall to be avoided: 
namely, that capital sentencing has a long, dark history of being racially 
discriminatory both against African Americans and against individuals 
convicted of killing White victims. Then the instructions would advise 
jurors that they must not employ discriminatory thinking or rely on racial 
stereotypes when forming their sentencing decision. Specifically, I 
propose the following instruction: 
Historically, juries have unfairly sentenced capital defendants to 
death based on their race or the race of their victim. Black 
defendants have been disproportionately sentenced to death. 
Defendants convicted of killing White victims have been 
disproportionately sentenced to death. To determine a fair 
sentence for this defendant, this jury must not consider the 
defendant’s race or the race of the victim in determining an 
appropriate punishment.349 
                                                   
Juror Decision-Making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 BEHAV. SCI. 
& L. 599, 599–600 (2000) [hereinafter Sommers, Race Salience]. 
347. Sommers, Race Salience, supra note 346, at 599–601; Sommers, Race in the Courtroom, 
supra note 345, at 1371 (“[W]hen racial norms are salient in a situation, most Whites will respond in 
an appropriately nonprejudiced manner, but in situations with more ambiguous racial norms, bias will 
often emerge . . . .”). 
348. See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in A Not Yet 
Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1597–1600 (2013) (discussing use and possible impact of 
race salient jury instructions); Elizabeth Ingriselli, Mitigating Jurors’ Racial Biases: The Effects of 
Content and Timing of Jury Instructions, 124 YALE L.J. 1690, 1698–99 (2015) (hypothesizing that 
jury instructions incorporating “implicit race salience” reduce implicit bias by reminding White jurors 
of their egalitarian values). 
349. Several jurisdictions are already employing jury instructions that address unconscious bias and racial 
discrimination. For example, a committee formed in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Washington proposed instructing jurors on the dangers of unconscious bias before jury selection and during 
its opening and closing instructions. See U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE W.D. WASH., CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/sites/wawd/files/CriminalJuryInstructions-ImplicitBias.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PME4-9RPV]. Similarly, Judge Mark Bennett of the Northern District of Iowa has long 
instructed jurors on implicit bias during jury selection and before opening statements. See Jerry Kang, et al., 
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1181–83 (2012). In March of 2017, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington also began requiring all prospective jurors to watch an 
eleven-minute video informing them of the dangers of unconscious bias. See U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE W.D. 
WASH, UNCONSCIOUS BIAS JUROR VIDEO, https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/jury/unconscious-bias (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2020); Marella Gayla, A Federal Court Asks Jurors to Confront Their Hidden Biases, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 21, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/06/21/a-federal-court-asks-
jurors-to-confront-their-hidden-biases [https://perma.cc/RD7W-JBD6] [hereinafter Hidden Biases]. To date, 
no one has conducted a study concerning the efficacy of the above instructions. The racial debunking 
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B. Instructing the Jury on its Power to Grant Mercy 
Another, perhaps surprising, solution to the problems posed by the 
current interpretation of the individualized sentencing requirement is the 
use of a mercy instruction. A mercy instruction informs jurors that, 
regardless of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented, a juror 
could choose to impose a life sentence for any reason. Mercy instructions 
have fallen out of favor in modern capital trials. The Supreme Court has 
held that the Eighth Amendment does not require states to issue a mercy 
instruction and has approved a now-commonly issued jury instruction that 
jurors “must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, 
passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.”350 Instructions 
authorizing the jury to bestow mercy are comparatively rare,351 a few 
states require them by statute,352 while others leave the decision to the 
discretion of the trial judge.353 
I propose that states issue the following mercy instruction: “Regardless 
of the evidence presented, you may vote to impose a sentence of life 
                                                   
instruction this Article proposes goes beyond merely informing jurors of the dangers of implicit biases; it 
specifically informs jurors of the type of bias—racial bias—that historically resulted in disproportionate 
sentencing. While I believe research suggests this difference improves the instruction because it serves to 
“debunk” racist decision-making, further study is  warranted.  
350. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 540–43 (1987); see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 
371 (1993) (“[W]e have not construed the Lockett line of cases to mean that a jury must be able to 
dispense mercy on the basis of a sympathetic response to the defendant.”). 
351. See, e.g., State v. Lorraine, 613 N.E.2d 212, 216–17 (Ohio 1993) (finding “[m]ercy, like bias, 
prejudice, and sympathy, is irrelevant to the duty of the jurors,” and an instruction forbidding jurors 
from considering mercy “serves the useful purpose of confining the jury’s imposition of the death 
sentence by cautioning it against reliance on extraneous emotional factors”). 
352. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2(c) (2018) (“Upon the conclusion of the evidence and 
arguments, the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions, and the jury shall retire to determine 
whether any mitigating or aggravating circumstances . . . exist and whether to recommend mercy for 
the accused.”). Georgia’s mercy instruction lacks the clarity of the ones proposed in this Article and 
conflates mercy and mitigation: “[m]itigating or extenuating facts or circumstances are those that you, 
the jury, find do not constitute a justification or excuse for the offense in question but that, in fairness 
and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame.” 
2.15.30 Death Penalty; Determination of Punishment, GA. SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTR. - 
CRIMINAL 2.15.30. Similarly, California instructs jurors that they may consider “[a]ny other 
circumstance, whether related to these charges or not, that lessens the gravity of the crime[s] even 
though the circumstance is not a legal excuse or justification. These circumstances include sympathy 
or compassion for the defendant or anything you consider to be a mitigating factor, regardless of 
whether it is one of the factors listed above.” See CAL. CRIMINAL JURY INSTR. 763, supra note 322, 
at 763. This instruction, confusingly, is often given alongside the instruction from Brown that states 
that jurors “must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public 
opinion or public feeling.” 479 U.S. at 540–43. 
353. See, e.g., Fox v. State, 779 P.2d 562, 574 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (jury was instructed that 
“[m]itigating circumstances are those which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or 
reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame”); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. 
REV. 305, 372 (discussing a 1982 case where a California jury was instructed that it was allowed “to consider 
pity, sympathy, and mercy as those factors may constitute a mitigating circumstance”). 
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without parole for any reason.” On the surface, this instruction appears to 
be the opposite of effective guidance, making juror discretion nearly 
limitless. While the instruction, admittedly, may result in some arbitrary 
outcomes, it would also bring about one of the two goals of the 
individualized sentencing requirement: shrinking the class of those who 
receive a death sentence to minimize false positives.354 This is consistent 
with the original vision of the individualized sentencing requirement, as 
set forth by Justice Burger in Lockett.355 The modern Court has also 
recognized the value of such an instruction in achieving reliability, noting 
that a “‘mercy’ jury instruction alone forecloses the possibility of 
Furman-type error as it ‘eliminate[s] the risk that a death sentence will be 
imposed in spite of facts calling for a lesser penalty.’”356 Finally, scholar 
Stephen Garvey has also advocated for mercy instructions, arguing that 
informing jurors of their power to grant mercy to capital defendants would 
“restructure” the discretion jurors already have toward 
minimizing    sentences.357 
Because it is less clear that a mercy instruction would reduce racial 
disparities in death sentence358—and, in fact, quite possible such an 
instruction would do the opposite—I propose that mercy instructions 
always be paired with racially salient debunking instructions. For 
example: 
You have the power to grant mercy to this defendant and impose 
a sentence of life without parole, regardless of the evidence 
presented. Historically, jurors have unfairly determined 
punishment based on the race of the defendant or the race of the 
victim. You must not consider the racial identities of the parties 
when determining whether to grant mercy. However, regardless 
of the evidence presented in this case, you may vote to impose a 
sentence of life without parole for any other reason. 
Because the relationship between mercy and race salience is hereto 
unexplored, more empirical research is needed before implementing this 
proposed solution. 
                                                   
354. See Garvey, supra note 103, at 993, 1004–07 (indicating that Garvey’s conclusions, like my own, rely 
on the assumption that there is a theoretical class of individuals who are deserving of the death penalty). 
355. See supra notes 102–107 and accompanying text. 
356. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 176 n.3 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Kansas v. Marsh, 548 
U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting)). Marsh was a 5–4 decision written by Justice Thomas. Id. at 165. 
357. See Garvey, supra note 103, at 1040. Garvey has also argued for reform on the front-end of 
the sentencing process: “[i]f we want greater consistency in capital sentencing, we should narrow the 
death-eligible class, not deny the jury the power to grant mercy.” Id.  
358. The Georgia capital sentencing statute, at issue in McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), requires 
jurors to be instructed on mercy (albeit in a less straightforward way). The Baldus study has 
demonstrated that the statute produces racially disparate outcomes based on the race of the defendant 
and the race of the victim. Compare notes 120–136 and accompanying text, with note 332. 
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CONCLUSION 
While liberal Justices have long believed the individualized sentencing 
requirement to be a critical component of a fair capital punishment 
system, in practice, the results have been disappointing. The expansive 
discretion that the requirement confers on overwhelmingly White juries 
has resulted in outcomes that are just as arbitrary and racially 
discriminatory as those that existed in the years before Furman. After 
years of attempting to limit the requirement, conservative justices led by 
Justice Scalia recently changed tactics in Carr, now pursuing extinction 
through expansion. While a rethinking of individualized sentencing is in 
order, the solution is not to end the requirement. Instead, states should 
employ jury instructions that provide guidance as to what evidence jurors 
must consider as mitigation and how they must consider it only as support 
for a life sentence. By channeling discretion, racist and arbitrary outcomes 
will be minimized and true individualized sentencing will be achieved. 
 
